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Preface and acknowledgements 
This study is the result of a two-year project. It was initiated at the Norwe-
gian Institute for Defence Studies and funded in its entirety by the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Defence. Most of the research has been carried out in the 
years 1999 and 2000. Yet as is evident from the sources used, some of the 
changes that have taken place during the first half of 200 I have been taken 
into account. 
The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies has long been engaged in 
security issues and Central European developments, This study is an at-
tempt to combine both fields. In the course of my work I have been able to 
draw upon the advice of my colleagues, of whom Sven G Holtsmark de-
serves special mention. I have benefited greatly both from his detailed 
knowledge of Polish politics, and his critical comments. 
In Warsaw, the editor Mrs. Maria Wagrowska and staff members of the 
journal Polska Zbrojna have been willing interlocutors and connection point 
for meeting Polish experts working on security issues. Of these, I am par-
ticularly grateful for having been able to meet with Gen. Dr. B. Balcerowicz 
of the Academy of National Defence, and Dr. OlafOsica of the Institute for 
Eastern Studies. In Brussels, members of the Polish delegation to NATO 
took time off to answer my queries and discuss Polish integration into 
NATO. The information they provided together has proved indispensable for 
my analysis. I also owe a debt of thanks to the staff at the University Li-
brary in Warsaw and at the Library of the London School of Slavonic Stud-
ies. 
Finally, it remains to be said that although I would prefer to share it with 
others, the responsibility for any faults and errors is solely mine. 
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Introduction and main questions 
In 1996, the Polish minister of defence Stanislaw Dobrzanski claimed that 
"Poland's entry would have a tremendous impact on NATO."' Many 
shared his view. Of the three countries admitted in 1999, Poland was re-
garded as the most important addition.' This positive evaluation was not so 
much due to size of territory or population dwarfing the two other entrants, 
as Polish ambitions to play an active role in the Alliance. This study will pro-
vide an assessment of this impact. 
Doing that necessitates going back to the decade preceding membership. 
During most of the 1990s, Polish foreign and security politics were geared 
towards gaining membership. Establishing close relations with western 
countries, above all the USA and Germany, was initially regarded as the 
most important task. Since neither of the two questioned the wisdom of en-
largement, bilateral problems were few. In Poland, co-operation with NATO 
enjoyed broad support and involved relatively little in terms of internal adjust-
ments or expenditure. Only when NATO policies towards the applicant 
countries gained a clearer outline, did this change. The most important step 
was the launching of Partnership-for-Peace (hence PiP) in January 1994. 
The chief aim was to facilitate co-operation between the Alliance and the 
countries that joined the programme. To achieve that, PfP listed a set of 
targets. Among these, the obligation to establish co-operative relationships 
with neighbouring states played a central part. NATO would not accept new 
members having unsettled accounts with their neighbours. For the Polish 
leadership, this was a daunting task. To the east, the country bordered on 
four newly independent states. Relations with these had traditionally been 
characterised by deep antagonisms. 
This study includes a survey ofPolish co-operation attempts with the 
eastern neighbours. This is not intended as mere background information, 
but is included in order to assess the impact of Polish membership on re-
gional stability. But there is a linkage here between Poland's eastern rela-
tions and Poland's standing in the Alliance that should not be underesti-
mated. If perceived within NATO as a provider of regional stability, or to 
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use the increasingly popular term 'exporter of security', Poland's standing 
will be boosted. In turn, this will increase Poland's ability to gain acceptance 
for viewpoints and p~licies among the other members. 
But NATO's requests were not limited to good neighbourly relations. 
The necessity of narrowing the gap the gap between training and equipD?ent 
of the Polish armed forces and NATO was also set as a priority. No Pohsh 
government questioned this, but the grand plans for upgrading and new pur-
chases have more often than not failed to yield the intended results. Analys-
ing why is relevant for several reasons. Above all, it will throw light on 
Polish adaptation to NATO's requirements and make it possible to discus~ 
whether Poland will be a military burden or a valuable addition. NATO tned 
to function as advisor and query board to Poland both during the PfP years 
and after membership was achieved. As will be shown, this was far from 
the unmitigated success Polish sources often make it into. This renders it 
necessary to question NATO's role as an advisor, and how will change in 
the wake of Polish membership. . 
Nevertheless, even if Polish eastern policy has made significant progress, 
and upgrading ofPolish military equipment and expertise is progressing, 
these are necessary but not sufficient to make an impact on NATO. Positive 
results may yield little more than courteous remarks from allies. What is 
required is for Poland to enter into a close relationship with other alliance 
members. The final part of this study will focus on Poland's possibilities of 
gaining support for its priorities. Polish views will have a bearing on alliance 
cohesion. Central issues here are the development of an EU-Ied military 
force and who to be invited in the next enlargement round. This part of the 
study cannot avoid being somewhat tentative. None of these issues has yet 
been finally settled. But in an assessment of whether Poland's impact is an 
asset or burden to NATO, it plays an integral part. 
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The road to NATO 
The following subchapters will discuss Polish-NATO relations as they devel-
oped during the 1990s. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, soon to be fol-
lowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, triggered the first reorientation of 
Polish security politics. The main question was whether Poland should go it 
alone, or together with the other Central European countries jointly try to 
attract Western interest and engagement in the region. Membership was 
only referred to as one, and a somewhat remote possibility. This soon 
changed, as will be shown this was above all due to political developments in 
Moscow. After an intensive period of relations building, Pfi' was launched 
and contacts were given an institutional basis. 
It must be said that the Polish government, once NATO was put on the 
agenda, did not have to vest much in convincing the population of the ben-
efits of membership. Polish perceptions ofNATO have been consistently 
positive all through the 1990s. At no point have opinion polls shown a support 
rate falling below 70 per cent.' Such strong support may be explained by 
referring to past experiences when Poland was a pawn in European power 
struggles. Many if not most explanations for Poland's quest for membership 
start here. NATO's Article 5 guarantee of assistance in case of military 
attack could therefore be presented as the main motive behind the member-
ship application. But other arguments came to play a stronger role in the 
course of the domestic debate. Notable among these was the interpretation 
of membership as synonymous with regaining sovereignty over security and 
foreign policy.' 
Sovereignty in the post-war period was limited, most important decisions 
concerning Polish security were made in Moscow. This was blatantly sym-
bolised in the appointment of the Soviet marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky as 
Polish deputy prime minister and minister of defence from 1949 to 1956. The 
domestic government was equated as alien, depending on Soviet assistance 
to survive. The overthrow of the Communist regime was seen as a first step 
towards regaining national sovereignty.' But as long as Poland was not allied 
with other western powers, sovereignty could easily be curtailed through 
decisions taken by others. NATO membership has been widely regarded as 
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the solution to this quandruy.' Apprehensions have lessened, but national 
sovereignty still remains a sensitive issue. Politicians and the press react 
strongly to any foreign political statements that can be interpreted as over-
looking, discarding or relegating Polish interests. 
Ending Soviet hegemony 
Communist rule in Poland ended with the first free parliamentruy elections in 
1989. The new political leadership did not have a readily prepared solution to 
the country's security situation. The options depended on the developing 
security architecture in Europe. A new and stronger role for the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) seemed a more likely option 
at the time than NATO enlargement. Early in 1991, the Polish deputy minis-
ter of defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz declared his government had no plans 
ofjoining NATO.' 
However, in the course of that year, the government's official position 
changed. This was not so much due to public debate as the Soviet attempts 
to oppress Baltic independence with military means in Januruy that year. 
This prompted the Central European governments into action. At a hastily 
convened meeting in Budapest, the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian 
foreign ministers demanded the termination of the Warsaw Pact's military 
co-operation. 
The impression of Central European unity was further strengthened 
shortly after when the heads of state of the three countries met in the Hun-
garian town Visegr:id. However, the declaration issued was rather tame, re-
ferring mainly to the need for joint solution of economic and trade issues. No 
efforts were made to institutionalise co-operation on security matters. Only 
the Polish foreign minister Skubiszewski wanted to expand joint efforts to 
cover this field.' 
At the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the only remnant 
of the Warsaw Pact in Prague in July 1991, the Pact was formally dissolved. 
The Soviet representatives recommended supplanting the Pact with a system 
ofbilateral security treaties. The Central European countries initially welcomed 
this idea. But then the Soviet side insisted that these treaties should include 
an article prohibiting the signatories from entering an alliance aimed at the 
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other party.' This was interpreted as little more than a continuation of Soviet 
hegemony over Central Europe, and promptly rejected by the Hungarian, 
Czechoslovak and Polish representatives. 
A month later, prominent Soviet politicians attempted to topple Gorbachev 
through a coup. This had strong reverberations in Central Europe. The Polish, 
Czechoslovak and Hungarian presidents gathered for emergency talks. In a 
joint declaration, the need for regular consultations on security issues with 
NATO was underlined. However, this was only intended as an interrim solu-
tion. The declaration concluded " ... there is a need to create conditions for 
the direct inclusion ofPoland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the activities 
oftheAIIiance."" This expression of unanimity seemed to signal the begin-
ning of Central European co-ordination on security matters. But any such 
endeavours stranded on the Czech prime minister V aclav Klaus' opposition 
to any kind of institutionalised Central European network outside NATO and 
the EU. According to him, that would only postpone the date of member-
ship." 
The Moscow coup attempt triggered the Czechoslovak and Hungarian 
governments to press for a rapid withdrawal of Soviet soldiers. Poland chose 
a different approach. The reason was Germany, or more precisely the German 
chancellor's remarks made in connection with German unification. These were 
interpreted as questioning the validity of the Polish-German border. The Polish 
foreign minister replied by questioning the wisdom of withdrawing Soviet 
soldiers. Kohl soon recanted. This delayed the process of troop transfer. Of 
the three new NATO members, Poland was the last to see the complete 
withdrawal of Soviet soldiers. This was not achieved until late October 1992 
three months after Czechoslovakia and more than a year after Hungary. In ' 
this connection, t_he slow pace of withdrawal from the three former Soviet 
Baltic republics was regarded with apprehension in Warsaw. Although with-
drawal was completed in neighbouring Lithuania in late August 1993, Soviet 
troops remained stationed in Latvia and Estonia another year. 
The withdrawal affected the countries in the region differently. In Hun-
gary and Czechoslovakia, the army left little more than derelict barracks and 
pollution problems. The soldiers that left were transferred to regions far 
away. Poland was different. Troops leaving Polish territory often went no 
further than across the border either to Belarus or to Kaliningrad. The up-
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surge of military personnel in the Kaliningrad region was accompanied by 
statements from the Russian leadership indicating that Kaliningrad would 
now be strengthened m)litarilyP In retrospect, these plans turned out to be 
short-lived. But at the time, there were no indications that this would neces-
sarily be the case. Russian moves were closely followed by Warsaw. 
NATO as the sole option 
Although NATO membership had been official policy already from the sum-
mer of 1991, other organisations with a security mandate existed. Some of 
these had emerged after 1989. The Visegr:id Triangle, then called the Quad-
rangle, and the Central-European Free Trade Associ~tion (CEFTA) were 
occasionally mentioned as solutions to meet the secunty problems of the 
region. This was above all due to the perception that e_conomic decline a?d 
increasing social poverty were the main problems facmg_the form~r Soviet 
block. Opinion polls conducted at the time proved that this perceptiOn was 
widely shared by the population in the countries, Pol~nd am~ng ~:m, as . 
well.n However, this awareness did not preclude an mterest m military al~I­
ances. Although Poles surveyed would agree that unemployment, corruption 
and crime were security risks, these factors did not prevent them from ex-
pressing a strong interest in NATO membership." 
NATO came to play a strong part in the political debate not least because 
none of the other regional organisations seemed to make any progress. Vise-
gr:id did not move beyond the level of discussion forum. CEFTA eased . 
trade barriers between the countries, but the EU is of course overshadowmg 
the organisation completely in the economic field. The numbers make thi~ 
clear. CEFTA is an organisation that stands a much better chance of surviVal 
in Western literature than in the region it is supposed to cover." 
Security from military threats was altogether different. No regi?na~ or-
ganisation was formed to address this issue. In fact, the only organisation 
with an explicit security mandate apart from NATO was the Con_fe~nce on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, renamed in 1994 the OrganisatiOn for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (hence OSCE). 
The Soviet view had been that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be 
subjugated to the OSCE. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the stance 
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was modified and a system whereby Europe was split in two with Russia 
being in charge of peacekeeping and crisis management in the eastern half 
and NATO and the WEU in the western, was proposed.16 With the excep-
tion of president Have! who briefly seemed to harbour some sympathies, · . 
these recommendations failed to attract any sizeable support in Central Eu-
rope. 
OSCE as an alternative option to NATO never received any noticeable 
attention in Poland.17 A few articles were written exploring the possibility of 
a non-aligned Poland, but concluded that this would mean a return to the 
buffer predicament of the inter-war years.18 One of those opposing NATO 
membership, Professor Marcin Kr61, argued that NATO was in chaos and 
disarray. This state would constrain Polish foreign policy autonomy and 
would pre-emptPolish mediation in East European conflicts.19 But Profes-
sor Kr61 remains an exception. It is difficult to find any trace of a debate in 
Poland on the possibility of altematives'to NATO. 
The wars in Yugoslavia showed that the efforts to create a system of 
interlocking, co-operating European institutions handling European security 
failed to reduce the conflict. Judging from contemporary Polish press reports 
on the war in Bosnia, NATO was regarded as the only organisation capable 
of ensuring safety against military aggression." 
Thus, a characteristic feature of the debate on security in Poland has been 
the clear-cut distinction between NATO and other international organisations 
when it came to security matters. The security dimension of most notably the 
EU, especially the efforts to formulate a common foreign and security policy 
and the potential usage ofWEU, were rarely discussed.'1 This is not difficult 
to explain when recalling that for most of the 1990s, a military component of 
the EU remained on the drawing board. 
Another feature of the debate was Polish politicians' consistent emphasis 
on Poland being accepted as an equal member. All signals coming from the 
west to the contrary, have been rejected. This was particularly evident in the 
various debates concerning costs. Especially the different scenarios proposed 
by R. D. Asmus, R. L. Kugler and F. St. ~bee which attracted consid-
erable attention in the West, seemed to relegate Poland to a buffer status.'' 
This prompted numerous rebuttals from Polish politicians and academics." 
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Building relations 
The first precursor to NATO's eastward expansion was the London Decla-
ration issued on 6 July 1990 calling for increased political and security co-
operation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members. In the declara-
tion, the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between NATO and 
these countries was recommended." 
At a summit meeting held in Rome in November the following year, 
NATO's new strategic concept of peacekeeping and crisis management 
was presented. Here, NATO asserted its will to respond to crisis outside the 
territory of the Alliance with specially trained rapid reaction forces. Along-
side this, the North-Atlantic Co-operation Council (henceforth NACC) was 
established with membership open for all members ofNATO, former mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact, non-aligned countries and former Soviet republics. 
The Council was to provide the framework for a joint discussion of security 
problems. 
Despite the expressed interest in NJITO membership, the Central Euro-
pean countries felt they failed to engage the Clinton administration in a con-
structive dialogue. The prevailing sentiment in the region was that the West 
focused exclusively on Russia. In particular Strobe Talbot, then U.S. deputy 
secretary of state, was regarded as an advocate for a 'Russia-first-and-
only-Russia' policy. This was worrying for the Central Europeans, especially 
since developments in Russian politics were interpreted as being heavily 
Soviet in style and content. The concept of a "near abroad' embracing the 
former Soviet Union republics as well as the insistence on a droit de regard 
over Central European security matters, became pronounced in the course 
ofl993.25 This approach enjoyed the support of all factions in the Russian 
Durna. In addition, the consolidation of the Commonwealth oflndependent 
States seemed to progress under Russian leadership. In 1992, a security 
agreement specifYing how the CIS countries should co-ordinate their secu-
rity and defence policies with Russia had been signed in Tashkent. This 
seemed like the return of the Soviet Union. The Central-European govern-
ments claimed their security concerns received scant attention." Western 
governments focused their efforts on president Yeltsin whom they perceived 
as an indispensable guardian of stability and reforms. 
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The lack of communication between Central Europe and Western lead-
ers early in the 1990s may have been due largely to differing perceptions of 
regional problems and adequate solutions. The Central Europeans had 
started to perceive security in terms of military alliances. The West did not. 
Until1993-94, it was expected that the eastward expansion of the EU would 
occur within the near future. A larger EU was supported by Russia, and 
regarded by many Western observers as the best reply to Central European 
security needs. But EU inaction combined with growing impatience in the 
region and strenuous lobbying from Central European emigre groups in the 
US, necessitated a NATO response of some kind where Poland and the 
other countries desiring membership were offered a modicum of institutional 
affiliation. The North Atlantic Council was regarded as insufficient. 
Partnership-for-Peace 
The launching of Partnership-for-Peace in January 1994 provided a frame-
work for regularised contacts with NATO qualitatively different from NACC. 
NACC meets twice annually when ministers from the more than forty 
member countries convene.Althoughjoint ambassadorial meetings are held 
monthly in Brussels, these are hardly arrangements conducive to close co-
operation. PiP opened up for daily consultations, facilitated greatly through 
the establishment of a Partnership Coordination cell located within the Su-
preme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, SHAPE, at Mons in Belgium. 
PfP contained a list of targets that were to form the basis for co-operation. 
Among these were democratic control and transparency in defence plan-
ning and budgeting, military co-operation with the alliance to facilitate joint 
operations in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and the obligation 
of each country to contribute to European security through close co-opera-
tion with its neighbours to overcome historical animosities. 
PfP was to be a bilateral relationship. The individual PfP country would 
decide the pace in achieving the rather generally formulated targets. NATO 
would provide the " ... participating states the possibility of strengthening their 
relations in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities."" 
PfP was not membership, and it was not a foregone conclusion that it would 
DEFENCE SlUDlES 4/2001 15 
lead to it. There was no inherent guarantee that membership was assured 
once a country had complied with all the targets defined. Polish politicians 
sometimes referred to PfP as ''Partnership for Appeasement". The official 
Polish attitude expressed by president Walesa was that PfP ran the danger 
ofbecoming a permanent waiting room." Yet, despite contemporary misgiv-
ings, PiP became an important instrument. PiP enabled the partnership 
countries to set individual targets for the upgrading of their military forces." 
Collaboration was reciprocal; it provided the Alliance with a testing ground 
for co-operating with non-members with security problems differing greatly 
from those traditionally handled. 
Co-operation between a partner country and NATO took the form of 
projects, each specifYing a distinct problem that would be solved with the 
assistance ofNATO. This assistance consisted mainly of advice and consul-
tations. Some funding was allocated from NATO to train officers from the 
partner countries where the lack of sufficient language skills had been iden-
tified as a major obstacle to co-operation. 
The number of projects a country entered with NATO was widely used 
as an indication of membership desires. By the end of 1997, the number of 
Polish PfP projects was 450, more than any other PfP country." This was 
significantly more than any other partnership country and gave Poland a 
considerable public relations advantage compared to the Czech Republic 
and Hungary where the political will to fund PfP activities was more limited. 
It should be added though, that the range ofPiP activities in Poland also led 
to very high expectation on the Western side as to how fast Poland could 
reform its armed forces and reach NATO levels of compatibility. In retro-
spect it seems clear that the number of projects entered was always far 
larger than the number of projects actually completed, and among those it 
seems fair to assume that the fmal results often deviated from the original 
intentions. But as far as can be ascertained, no publicly accessible analysis 
of completion rate is available." 
Civilian control 
The establishment of civilian control over defence matters and security politics 
was not expected to pose a significant problem in the case of Poland. Not 
16 DEFENCE STUDIES 412001 
only had the country been the first in the region to break with the Communist 
system, but president Walesa was a strong supporter of NATO membership. 
Nevertheless, how civilian control was to be implemented and guaranteed 
became a subject of a lengthy controversy. 
Walesa tried to exploit the strong support NATO enjoyed to increase his 
own influence over politics. Concerning the military, he did not have to do 
anything. President Walesa had a strong supporter in General Tadeusz 
Wilecki, atthe time chief of the General Staff." Moreover, the Communist 
regime had endowed him with an institutional arrangement that vested maxi-
mum control with the president and virtually none with parliament. 
Parliament objected to this set-up. In March 1990, two prominent Soli-
darity members were made deputy ministers of defence with the mandate 
of introducing civilian control. But this attempt failed and a deadlock re-
mained until 1994 when military intelligence was transferred from the Minis-
try ofDefence to the General Staff." This move precluded all possibilities 
of parliamentary monitoring ofintelligence activities, but more importantly 
this move had a negative impact on parliamentary efforts to achieve control 
over defence planning and expenditures. 
Relations between parliament and the military leadership reached an all-
time high in autumn 1994. At a dinner party with the then minister of defence 
Piotr Kolodziejczyk and higher military commanders present, the latter group 
used the occasion to hold a vote of confidence against the minister." They 
did this with full presidential backing, Walesa had shortly before stated that 
"the army is to be governed by the military''." 
The issue was not fmally settled until the 1996 Law on the Qffice of the 
Defence Minister explicitly placed the Ministry under civilian control. At the 
same time Wilecki lost his position, one might add to widespread political 
acclaim and media coverage. The new chief of Staff, general Henryk Szumski 
made no attempt to challenge the changes that had caused the downfall of 
his predecessor. 
Politicians and officers who regarded the previous Polish set-up as con-
travening NATO practice had referred to PiP requirements as a source of 
support." In this, they had been strongly supported by the few western se-
curity experts who visited Poland. 
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Using NATO as a tool to achieve parliamentruy control meant that the 
Alliance had become associated with democratisation, and as such became 
an integrated part of internal political reforms. This linkage has further en-
hanced Polish support for further NATO expansion. 
Agnieszka Gogolewska, a political scientist, has analysed the parliamen-
truy struggle to achieve control. In her opinion this had less to do with avert-
ing militruy interference in politics than with the more mundane issue of pub-
lic money." The defence sector lived off the taxpayers and had to be made 
accountable to their representatives in parliament. Unless investment deci-
sions are done openly, i.e. under parliamentruy control, there was no guaran-
tee that the investments will be used in accordance with politically defined 
targets. 
PfP in retrospect: a mixed legacy 
The fundamental idea behind PtP was that the partner country should initi-
ate projects and that NATO would offer assistance during implementation 
and fmally review it on completion. This meant a break with the top-down 
approach characterising the Warsaw Pact. But NATO's ability to offer the 
appropriate assistance was limited especially during the early years. On the 
Polish side, authorities were at times inundated with offers and the amount 
of co-ordination undertaken centrally was poor. Even when negotiations had 
been conducted and a project plan agreed, implementation at lower levels 
was not guaranteed. If an agreement had been struck at lower levels, a go-
ahead from central quarters could not automatically be expected. 
Looking at the projects that were initiated, the large majority targeted the 
diffusion of skills. Together with projects mapping infrastructure deficien-
cies, they were designed to achieve a modicum of interoperability with 
NATO in a select number of areas. They encompassed command, control 
and communications, NATO operational procedures, aircraft identification 
systems and logistic support. But this unavoidably meant that other areas 
were given scant attention. Defence planning must be counted among these. 
~~ 1997-9~, NATO officials became aware that the plans for upgrading 
of mthtary eqmpment and human resources put forward by the Ministry of 
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National. Defence often defined targets beyond reach." The impression on 
the side ofNATO was that Poland expected NATO to issue priorities that 
would serve as a go-ahead for Polish planning. 
NATO as advisor 
The causes for failure to complete projects on schedule or as intended can-
not be blamed on Polish recipients alone. NATO officials have often pointed 
to the existence of a "mental barrier" impeding communication as an expla-
nation. But PtP was a novel institution, and one may ask to what extent NATO 
was prepared for the task and whether enough efforts were undertaken from 
the Western side to overcome the mental barrier. 
Analyses and comments on the PtP process have often been confined to 
the political criteria set by the Alliance and the partner countries' efforts to 
comply. The need to increase the level of competence within tlte partners' 
military forces ensuring a modicum of interoperability with NATO has been 
offered far less attention." This is regrettable for at least two reasons: 
NATO's ability to proffer advice will provide us with an indicator of the rap-
prochement between the Alliance and the partner countries, in this case 
Poland. Secondly, NATO credibility as a militruy alliance is influenced by the 
level ofinteroperability. 
NATO was not prepared for the role as advisor. But, it should be added, 
neither were the partner countries. It was both a question of former adver-
saries trying to single out areas for co-operation, and bridging the discrep-
ancy between expectations on the part of the partner countries and wjJat 
NATO was capable of offering. The PtP countries expected NATO assist-
ance far in excess of what the Alliance could contribute both iri terms of 
available manpower, but also in terms of money. But the largest gap was 
created by the former Warsaw Pact countries' belief that although they now 
had transferred their allegiance from Moscow to the West, the two militruy 
alliances shared the same basic features. Bureaucrats and officers had been 
trained to ensure the implementation of detailed instructions issued from above. 
There would be instructions and detailed schedules covering all aspects of 
army life. This policy efficiently removed all scope for independent decision-
making. Expectations were thatthis policy would remain unaltered. 
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The lack of initiative and independentthinking remained the most impor-
tant obstacle to efficient co-operation between NATO and Poland during the 
first years ofPfP. Getting a dialogue started proved difficult. In practical 
terms this meant that NATO advisors often were at a loss as to whether 
they had received all the necessary information to ensure that the design of 
a co-operation project ensured an efficient use of money and men. Accord-
ing to many Western officers and MoD officials engaged in co-operation 
with Poland, this process is far from terminated. The Polish side had to form 
a clear picture of what was 1required, and how NATO could assist." 
NATO's capacity to work out detailed plans was limited, and this part was 
left to the Poles, NATO could assist during implementation but the responsi-
bility was to be that ofPoland. Only at the fmal point, when a project would 
be reviewed and assessed, was NATO committed to participate. 
Only gradually did the relationship change towards genuine dialogue and 
intensified co-operation. Yet, this change has left lower levels relatively unaf-
fected. Although no precise figures can be given to justif'y this conclusion, it 
seems to be a common experience for western countries involved in assist-
ance or co-operation with military units, bases etc. that the recipients expect 
clear and detailed guidelines specif'ying what they were to do and when to 
do it. This includes mundane tasks such as the upgrading of western equip-
ment either purchased or donated. One may expect that this situation will 
change and that the differences between Western and Polish practice will 
eventually even out. 
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Polish Eastern Policy 
In 1997, V .S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright justified NATO en-
largement as a means to achieve stability: " ... the new NATO can do for 
Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old 
hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and 
deter violence."" The choice of verbal form should be noted, 'can do' indi-
cated that the completion of this task lay in the future and that the process 
could be derailed. There was no automatic guarantee that NATO presence 
would assure peaceful conditions and co-operation across the borders. This 
depended on the countries themselves. 
Poland faced a particular challenge in this respect. Historically, relations 
with all the bordering countries had been marked by antagonism. This was 
mirrored in popular opinion polls where none of the surrounding nationalities, 
with the possible exception of the Czechs, was perceived as friendly." Of 
the surrounding countries, none posed greater problems than the new states 
established in the east: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. This chapter is an ac-
count of how Poland has attempted to engage these new neighbours first in 
a co-operative relationship. If Poland succeeded in this task, accusations 
that NATO enlargement created new dividing lines would lose validity. 
With the Polish efforts having to start from scratch, it was close to im-
possible to envisage what directions the relationship would take. Much de-
pended on the political vagaries of the countries concerned. A brieflook at 
the map makes clear that the interests and problems of Lithuania differ fun-
damentally from those ofUkraine. Thus, any similarities in the bilateral rela-
tionships were hardly to be expected, apart from the basic presumption that 
all parties were interested in mutual co-operation. But the main challenge 
was not so much the establishment ofbilateral diplomatic relations and sign-
ing agreements on good neighbourly relations, as the need to provide them 
with a genuine basis for co-operation. In addition to trade and cultural ex-
changes, security issues soon came to play an important role. Why and how 
will be emphasised here. 
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When independence movements gained momentum in the neighbouring 
Soviet republics from the late 1980s, they put the Polish government in a 
quandary. On the one hand, these movements enjoyed broad support in Po-
land, on theotherthe government needed to maintain good relations with Mos-
cow. Thus, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not release any 
diplomatic rush from Warsaw towards the newly independent states. This 
was due not only to the popular misgivings mentioned above, or the conflict 
between president and government over the responsibility for foreign policy 
described in the preceding chapter. A basic problem that long remained un-
resolved concerned what role post-Soviet Eastern Europe should be given in 
Polish foreign policy. 
Walesa did not want to create the impression that both directions, East 
and West, were given the same weight. The main emphasis was put on cre-
ating a dialogue with NATO and the EU. It is relevantto underline that the 
resources available to conduct foreign policy were limited. Resources should 
here be understood as staff skilled in Western languages, time available for 
negotiations and the money required for trips abroad. instead of spreading 
these resources thinly across the board, priority was given to the two Brus-
sels-based organisations. In addition, political and economic relations with 
Germany came to play an increasingly important role. 
The political leadership could not assume that the broad support for an 
active Western policy would apply in the case of an Eastern policy. The 
unsettled historical questions as well as the situation for the Polish minorities 
in Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania and Slovakia opened up a set of issues that 
would not only be hard to solve, but also difficultto control politically. Re-
ports on discrimination against compatriots across the border could inflame 
public opinion and undermine the decision to emphasise relations with the 
West. Moreover, any attempts to improve Polish relations with Lithuania, 
Belarus or Ukraine, could not avoid affecting Polish-Russian relations. Re-
percussions could possibly take the form of cutbacks on Russian deliveries 
of gas and oil. Thus, some politicians clearly favoured a cautious approach 
to the newly independent states in the East fearing that a too bold Polish 
policy would antagonise Moscow. 
Among them was foreign minister Skubiszewski who during a parlia-
mentary debate in early 1993, advocated a neutral position for Poland in the 
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disagreements between Moscow and the former Soviet republics. He stated 
that "Russia has remained a major power, despite its current limitations and 
problems, and it is going to reinforce this position .... Poland does not want 
to side with either partY in the conflict."" 
This view was severely criticised by the president and the political oppo-
sition claiming that it reflected a deferential attitude towards Russia charac-
teristic of the past. But this criticism did not translate into action. Both presi-
dent and opposition used the opportunity to reap political benefit, hardly a 
difficult task in this particular case. But neither had any clearly formulated 
alternative policy to present to parliament One reason may have been the 
impression that foreign minister Skubiszewski's argument reflected the bal-
ance of power quite accurately. Russia was a regional great power with the 
ability to influence developments, whereas Poland lacked the necessary 
international backing to risk implementing a policy Moscow might interpret 
as a provocative challenge. 
In particular, the minister of foreign economic relations Podkanski rec-
ommended such a policy to secure a positive dialogue with Moscow. The 
political opposition, and in particular the then chairman of the Sejm's Foreign 
Policy Committee Bronislaw Geremek immediately accused the centre-left 
Pawlak government of harbouring Russophile sentiments. Geremek de-
clared that any" ... emphasis on a privileged Polish-Russian dialogue may 
be viewed with alarm .... This is disturbing and can amount to a violation of 
the principle of consensus over Polish foreign policy."" Geremek feared 
that a closer Polish-Russian political relationship would be detrimental to 
NATO membership possibilities. 
But advocating more attention directed eastwards was not necessarily 
synonymous with more attention directed to Moscow. A growing number of 
politicians and commentators accused the government of neglecting the 
countries in-between, i.e. Ukraine, Belarus and the three Baltic republics 
Lith'lania, Latvia and Estonia. The editor of the influential Paris-basedjour-
nal Kultura, Jerzy Giedroyc claimed the political elite completely lacked a 
concept of what Poland's role in the Central European region should be." 
At the time, his criticism seemed apposite. Until the launching ofPfP in 
1994, Polish foreign policy had concentrated on the West with little success. 
NATO's main concern was to develop a dialogue with Moscow. The EU 
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maintained a political dialogue with the Central European countries. At the 
same time, it barred its markets from unwelcome competition through strict 
enforcement of quota regulations. Thus, none ofthe government's endeav-
ours seemed to have yielded any results in terms of closer integration with 
the West. But that did not automatically mean a redirection of resources and 
increased prominence for an eastern policy. 
However, Pf)' turned out to provide Poland with two necessary assets 
required for a m~re active approach. First of all it provided Poland with insti-
tutionalised channels for dialogue with NATO and its members. Particular 
problems could also be presented and discussed in the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council where all PiP-countries were members. Secondly, Polish-
Russian relations had lost their exclusive bilateral character. 
Ukraine 
From the outset, it was obvious that developments in Ukraine, and in particu-
lar the relationship between K yiv and Moscow would have a far greater 
impact on Poland than any political debacle in Lithuania or Belarus. To Po-
land, Ukraine was and still remains the gravest security concern. Any major 
political changes there will have immediate consequences for Polish security 
in the widest sense, both militarily and economically. 
Poland is indeed among the few countries apart from Russia with a close 
interest in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine contrasts sharply with other countries 
in the region, e.g. Lithuania where several Western countries have vied for 
the attention. Ukraine is different in that Western attention for a long time 
has overlooked it, focusing instead on Russia. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the Ukrainian government worked to establish closer contacts with Western 
Europe, and clearly expected that these initiativ~s would be reciprocated." 
The West seized upon only one initiative, nuclear disarmament pressing hard 
for the transfer of nuclear arms to Russian territory. Apart from financial 
suppoJ1, no form of security guarantees was issued. Ukraine had problems 
finding.any partners that were interested or had anything to offer beyond the 
level of polite remarks. Poland was the only exception. 
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Poland's role 
The Polish Security Strategy published in 2000, provides a good indication 
of the importance Poland attributes to Ukraine. No other country is men-
tioned as frequently and attributed with the same importance. And it should 
be added, in no other case does Poland aspire to assume such an active role: 
Poland will work for the development of a strategic partnership with an 
independent and democratic Ukraine, which is one of the most impor-
tant elements of stability and security in Europe. We shall support, to 
the best of our abilities, the democratic authorities in Kyiv in their 
efforts to consolidate Ukraine's independence and stability, and forge 
stronger links with European integrations structures. 4' 
Exactly Ukrainian independence, and this should be read as independence 
from Moscow, is thesine qua non ofPolish policy towards Ukraine. 
This willingness to play the role as Ukraine's advocate did not emerge 
rapidly. Poland's early recognition ofUkrainian independence was followed 
by years of inactivity. Relations startedto improve in the course ofl993. In 
his o'!tline ofPolish foreign policy priorities presented to the Sejm in April ' 
that year, foreign minister Skubiszewski underlined that Poland wanted to 
support Ukrainian independence." 
Despite this positive attitude, relations were hardly given a flying start. 
Attempts to establish a framework for economic co-operation faltered, main-
ly due to the gap in reform progress between the two. Likewise, the Ukrain-
ian proposal from 1992 to establish a "security zone" from the Baltic to the 
Black Sea whereby the countries would co-operate closely on security mat-
ters received a negative response in Warsaw. Joining would contradict Polish 
efforts to gain NATO membership. 
However, the Polish attitude towards a purely bilateral security co-opera-
tion was more favourable. InApril1994, minister of defence Piotr Kolo,. 
dziejczyk visited Kyiv to explore the possibilities for co-operation. The initia-
tive was welcomed, and it was agreed that a Ukrainian unit should partici-
pate in the Co-operation Bridge exercises held near Poznan in September 
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1994. The following year saw a rapid growth in military and political con-
tacts with talks held between the chiefs of staff of both countries and be-
tween the defence ministers. Cross-border co-operation between the Polish 
Cracow Military and the Ukrainian Carpathian Military Districts also devel-
oped. 
Co-operation with Poland strengthened Kyiv's contacts with the West, 
and provided at the time one of the very few westward channels for contact 
and communication. This prompted a change in Ukrainian foreign policy 
towards looking at NATO enlargement in positive terms. By the end of 
1995, president Kuchma not only stated that NATO enlargement to the East 
did not threaten Ukraine, but added that NATO was an element of stability 
in Europe." 
In 1995 president Clinton visited Kyiv. A PfP programme was developed 
and a document underlining the need for a special dialogue between NATO 
and Ukraine was signed in September. Poland supported these measures 
strongly, and played the role as intermediary. It should be added that Polish 
efforts in other forums have been successful. These include securing 
Ukrainian membership in the Council ofEurope. And in 1996, Poland used 
its position as chairman of the Central European Initiative to grant Ukraine 
membership. The Initiative was established in 1991. The founding members 
counted Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Italy. Membership 
has later been expanded and now amounts to 16 countries." Although some 
projects involving agriculture and small-business development and youth 
exchange have been conducted under its auspices, the Initiative is basically 
little more than a discussion forum. But it may provide Ukraine with an op-
portunity to develop links with the neighbouring countries to the West. 
From rhetoric to action 
The Ukrainian leadership's dismal reform record hampers co-operation with 
the West Although the presidency enjoys strong executive powers, president 
Kuchma has so far not taken advantage of them to initiate reforms that 
would be conducive to Western investments in the economy. Ukraine is of 
great strategic importance, but without the necessary economic and political 
reforms in operation, the economic links necessary to create a stable foun-
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dation for the political contacts are absent. This imbalance applies to military 
~peration." Apart ~m Poland, the only other NATO country with suffi-
Cient re~ources, and patience should be included as a vital one, is the USA. 
Suffice 1! here to repeat the conclusions drawn in a recent analysis: 
Despite some important accomplishments in the development of the 
Ukrainian military since 1992, there is still no coherent and integrated 
military reforms strategy for the development of the armed forces; no 
careful balancing of stated commitments and scarce resources. 52 
Without ?"Y.clear priorities within the Ukrainian military, co-operation is dif-
ficult._ It I~ difficult to assess what is needed and whether this is matched by 
what 1s g~ven. Yet, one may argue that this problem affects NATO and in 
~articular the USA as main donor more directly than Poland. Polish-Ukrain-
•an co-oper~tion involv:s joint exercises, exchange and training of officers. 
These are tm~e~n~ummg tasks, but they are not particularly costly. 
The Ukram1an s1de has repeatedly tried to attract a Polish commitment 
~ defence industrial p~jects. The Polish attitude has in general been nega-
tiVe. Only when th: projects are short-termed and limited to specific prob-
l:ms h~ co-operation taken place. An example in point is the agreement 
s•gn:d m Jan~ 2~0 1 by the two countries' defence ministers on the up-
gradmg ofPohsh MIG-29 and Su-22 military aircraft in Ukraine. 
Polish co-operation with Ukraine has been a protracted process. The 
apparent harmony on the political level cannot hide the fact that achieve-
~ents have been slow and often less than intended. The plans for the estab-
hsh_n:tent of a joint Polish-Ukrainian brigade illustrate this fully. Despite the 
poh!ical support from the defence ministers, implementation was constantly 
~elayed. In 1998, three years after the plans had been broached for the frrst 
tune, Pol~d completed its contribution. At thattime, neither the Polish nor 
the ~kram1an parliament had ratified the agreement. This was done the fol-
l~wmg year. The main reason has been lack of money on the Ukrainian 
s1de." 
The emphasis given to Ukraine has occasionally been criticised in Po-
land." But there are no indications that this policy is due to change. Rather, 
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the Polish government has deliberately played the Ukrainian card to attract 
Western military, political and economic involvement to the region. Although 
the results have been far from impressive, Polish priorities remain unper-
turbed. During his survey ofPolish foreign policy presented to parliament in 
200 I, foreign minister Bartoszewski stated that Poland was " ... seeking the 
greatest possible involvement ofthe US and the European Union in support-
ing Ukraine's European option"." This was almost a verbatim echo of pres-
entations made to parliament in the preceding years. 
The only Western country that takes an active interest seems to be the 
USA. During president Bush's visit to Warsaw in June 2001, the need to 
assist Ukraine was on the agenda." This is of course not the first time such 
statements have been made. Suffice it here to conclude that if no-thing el~e 
is achieved, Bush's statements will further consolidate Poland's pro-US 
leanings. 
Like Poland, the U.S. has been concerned that Ukraine should maintain 
its policy of distance to Moscow. This is, as has already been mentioned, far 
easier politically than economically. But so far, only Russian industry has dis-
played a strong interest in investing in Ukraine. Russian companies have 
purchased shares in their Ukrainian counterparts, or in other cases received 
shares as payment for goods. Since 2000, official relations have improved as 
well. Plans have been launched for large-scale co-operation in space re-
search and aviation." This may have a spillover effect on the armaments 
industries~• The Moscow newspaper Kommersant commented on 24 January 
200 I that "Russian-Ukrainian military co-operation is set to develop to suph 
an extent that Ukraine, which has been tilting toward NATO, will now lean 
toward Moscow."" This may be little more than wishful thinking on the 
Russian side; there have been no indications that Ukraine wants to scale 
down its relations with the West including Poland. But writings like these are 
bound to cause misgivings in Warsaw. 
Russia 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish perceptions ofRussian devel-
opments have been markedly less optimistic than the views held in the West. 
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The Polish political leadership, irrespective of party affiliation, has never 
disregarded the possibility of an anti-democratic backlash in Russia. This 
accords with the prevailing attitudes in the other Central-European coun-
tries. Post-Soviet Russia attempted early on to distance itself from the So-
viet policies an~ actions in the region by officially expressing regret for what 
had been commttted and at the same time emphasising the discontinuity 
created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, as the Austrian scholar 
<;'erhard Mangott has remarked, the new Russia was not considered par-
ttcularly new by the ruling elites in the region." 
Th~s, it is no s~rprise that co-operation on security matters at best played 
a margmal role dunng the 1990s. The Polish side launched different small-
scale initiatives. Apart from the occasional seminar where Polish and Rus-
sian security experts stated their opinions on the pros and cons ofNATO 
enlar~ement, nothing else took place. Russian predictability on the enlarge-
ment tssue was broken at one point, raising expectations that Moscow's 
negative attitude would change. During a visit to Warsaw in August 1993 
preside~! Yeltsin stated he had no objections to Polish NATO membershi;. 
T ravelhng onto Prague, he repeated that Russia had no right to prevent the 
Czech Republic from joining any organisation." But soon his aides had re-
buffed all interpretations that Russian policy had changed. 
~ 1994, attempts were made to give bilateral relations a new footing. 
Judgmg from the political outlooks of the foreign ministers of the two coun-
tries this seemed to be within reach. Kozyrev was regarded as pro-Western 
and strong voi~es in the Pawlak government (mid-1993-1995) had expressed 
an u~derstandmg for a Russian sphere of interest in Eastern Europe. In Cra-
cow m late February, the two chaired a conference optimistically entitled 
"Towards~~~ Partnership". The Polish side came to the meeting with a 
number of mtttatives that would have provided bilateral relations with an 
institutional framework. With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA 
relations had faltered. Trade had dwindled, the Polish side wanted to estab-' 
!ish financial arrangements that could function as a clearinghouse for the 
?arter ~e still predominating. In addition, crime had grown alongside the 
mcreasmg number of Russian visitors to Poland. This was an issue that re-
quired joint efforts. 
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The conference was a failure. The Polish initiatives were given scant 
attention by the Russians. Foreign minister Kozyrev used the occasion to 
reiterate his opposition not only to Polish NATO membership but also to the 
PfP, at the time only a few months old. He claimed that the very term "part-
nership" was unslavic, and thus unsuited for countries like Poland and Rus-
sia. Instead, he launched the terms ''common changes or perestroika" with-
out specifying what that was supposed to mean." Marek Calka, a Polish 
diplomat has summed up the impression this made on the hosts: ''This seem-
ingly trivial change confirmed that the Russian approach to Polish-Russian 
relations was conipletely different from that ofPoland. "63 During the rest of 
1995 and the following year, no improvement in relations could be detected. 
Polish politicians continued to visit Moscow to elicit possible areas for co-
operation without success. 
But the guilt should perhaps be more equally divided than Mr. Calka's 
statement implies. As discussed earlier, the Polish leadership failed to draw 
up a consistent and realistic policy due to 
... a lack of co-ordination in, Poland of individual decision making 
centres, conflicts between the President, Government and Parliament 
and ever greater differences between the main political forces in respect 
to the policy towards Russia. 64 
But at the time, this was not perceived as a particularly severe problem. 
Relations with Russia were regarded as a matter of secondary importance 
compared to the need to safegnfl'"d Polish NATO-membership. 
An improvement in relations has occurred in recent years. Russian and 
Polish spokesmen have stated that the chill of the previous years when little 
was done to further bilateral relations, is now a thing of the past." But how 
the political entente will be translated into political action remains to be seen. 
Although it is difficult to rank the factors explaining why the chill of pre-
vious years has evaporated, Russia's need to develop a better working rela-
tionship with NATO has most certainly played a major part. But the fact 
that NATO membership for Poland no longer figures on the agenda, looms 
large as well. It should be noted that security experts from the Baltic coun-
tries often refer to Poland as an example of how relations with Moscow 
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improve, once membership is a fait accompli. Clearly, they expect the same 
to happen once they have joined the Alliance. 
Energy and security 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia's 
strong role in Polish foreign trade had been regarded with apprehension.66 
The Jack of reforms in Russia was regarded as an impediment to Polish 
adaptation to market mechanisms. But in the course of the decade, trade 
issues lost much of their political salience, not least because commerce with 
the West developed rapidly diminishing Russia's importance. In 1990, Russia 
had ranked second in terms of imports (20 percent of total) and exports (IS 
per cent of total), tailing closely behind Germany. In 1998, this had changed 
completely. Just above 5 per cent of all Polish imports came from Russia, 
slightly more, 5, 7 per cent of all Polish exports were destined for Russia." 
There is one exception to this development. Russia has retained its position 
as Poland's main supplier of energy." 
Dependence on Soviet and later Russian natural gas deliveries has been 
regarded with apprehension since the beginning of the 1990s. Poland ran the 
riskofbeing blackmailed, e.asily achieved by simply switching off gas deliv-
eries. Both the Military Doctrine published in July 1992 and the Security 
Strategy adopted in January 2000 emphasise the need to look for alternative 
suppliers." 
The gas was switched off, albeit briefly, in the winter of both 1992 and 
the following year when deliveries suddenly and without warning stopped. It 
turned out that the reason was not Russian political pressure against Poland, 
but rather reduced Russian deliveries to Ukraine in response to Ukrainian 
payment arrears. The Ukrainian solution was simply to siphon off the gas 
quantities required. 
Ukraine is the junction for Russian gas exported to the West. Close to 95 
per cent of all exports cross Ukrainian territory." West European gas demand 
is increasing and the Russian exporters are eager to secure a second route 
reducing dependence on Ukraine to avoid the illicit tapping of gas. Plans were 
launched early in the 1990s. In 1993, Poland and Russia made an agreement 
concerning the construction of a new pipeline transporting gas from Yamal 
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to Western Europe. If completed, the transit fees would mean a steady 
source of income, either in cash or in gas volumes for Poland. The construc-
tion would also mean employment opportunities for Polish workers and con-
tracts for the engineering industry. The fact that the pipeline will go through 
Belarus may possibly serve as an entry for Polish enterprises to the Belo-
russian market as well. 
But it is exactly the choice of trajectory that has put the Polish authorities 
in a quandary. The pipeline will circumvent Ukraine. If the plan is carried 
through, it will reduce Russian dependence on the pipelines running through 
Ukraine drastically, and deprive that country of one of its few stable sources 
ofincome.71 
Polish authorities are forced to move with utmost care to avoid upsetting 
relations with Ukraine while at the same time remaining open to Russian 
suggestions. Just how delicate the situation was became clear in May 2000 
when deputy economics minister Jan Szlazak resigned. Officially, this was 
due to the slow restructuring of the coalmining sector. Yet, the Warsaw 
weekly Polity/ea claimed that Szlazak was forced to quit after a letter writ-
lento Gazprom in February where he expressed his interest in Gazprom's 
plans without prior consultations with the rest of the government. 72 Accord-
ing to the magazine, Gazprom had suggested building a pipeline from Poland 
to Slovakia, thus connecting the planned pipeline with the transit network 
running westwards from the Ukrainian-Siovak border. 
During president K wasniewski 's visit to Moscow in July 2000, Russia re-
launched the proposal both in the bilateral talks between the presidents and 
during plenary meetings. In an interview after the meeting, K wasniewski ad-
mitted that the issue had been raised but claimed no fmal decision had been 
made. Moreover, he regarded the issue as primarily of an economic and not 
a political nature." That assessment was taken as an affront to Ukraine by 
the leadership in Kyiv. Thus, foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek was com-
pelled to issue a statement where exactly the political nature of the plan was 
underlined: "I am convinced there will be no such agreement, for it's not in 
Poland's interest, and I think the Russian side is also aware of that."'' In the 
following months, senior Polish politicians and government ministers repeat-
edly made official statements reassuring Ukraine that their interest would be 
given weight." But this is not the same as an outright refusal. 
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Although the new pipeline will supply extra volumes of gas to Poland, the 
Polish authorities have not put the recommendations from the Security Strat-
egyto rest. The possibility of constructing a pipeline tying the Polish network 
to the North Sea gas field have been explored several times during the 1990s. 
In June 2001, the Polish Oil and Gas Company and the Danish DONG com-
pany agreed to form a consortium to construct a pipeline linking the two 
countries and making the transport of gas from Norway possible. If com-
pleted, it would lessen dependence on Russia. In late August 200 I, the out-
going Polish government signed a deal with Norway for the import of 
approx. 5 billion cubic metres of gas from 2008.76 This is slightly less than 
half the amount of gas consumed in 2000. The Polish centre-left govern-
ment elected soon after the deal with Norway was signed, may opt for re-
negotiations due to the price which is substantially above Russian imports. 
But if the government chooses to go through with the deal, Russian pressure 
against Polish authorities over the new gas transit route would be weakened. 
Poland would be less susceptible to accept Russian offers simply because no 
alternative supplier is available. So far, the Polish authorities have been very 
cautious, refraining from making any explicit commitments. 
Caution on the Polish side is not only necessary due to the anticipated 
consequences for Ukraine. In November 2000, Gazeta ffYborcza revealed 
that an optic cable had been laid along the Polish stretch of the Yamal-Eu-
rope pipeline." This had been done without informing the Polish authorities, 
apparently by withholding the details from the construction plans agreed. 
When completed, the cable would be the main communication highway be-
tween Russia and the West carrying telephone calls and electronic data. To 
Poland this means a sizeable income in transit fees. According to data pro-
vided by Gazeta ffYborcza, the current fees amount to 52 million zlotys 
annually ($11.4 million). In short, Russian tactics have not been conducive to 
finding a compromise in the gas route question. A fmal solution is still pend-
ing. 
Confronting NATO enlargement 
Russian media have repeatedly focused on two aspects of enlargement, one 
concerned costs, the other the consequences for Russia's position in the 
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region. The issue of costs had gained prominence after the U.S. assistant 
defence secreta!)' Franklin D. Krarner in 1997 openly chided the Czech 
government for not spending enough to prepare the armed forces for mem-
bership, an accusation later repeated by NATO officials." This was dwelt 
upon by the Russian press arguing that scarce resources would be wasted 
on militaiy means." 
The other aspect, concerning the consequences for Russia remained more 
diffuse; this may be attributed to a general lack of directions for Russian 
foreign policy on the region. At the time of accession, the prevailing senti-
ment seems to have been that the region was lost to Russian influence." 
But until enlargement was a fact, Russian foreign policy worked hard to 
produce solutions short of full membership in NATO for the applicants. For-
eign minister Primakov argued in favour of a "French option" for the new 
members, i.e. letting new members participate in the political structures but 
barring them from full militaiy participation. Poland immediately declared 
that this was unacceptable, a position that was later repeated in Prague and 
Budapest. 
After the June 1996 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
Primakov repeated his opposition to an expansion ofNATO's militaiy infra-
structure to Central Europe. In his definition, this included not only troops 
and hardware, but also joint militaiy command structures, air defence sys-
tems and intelligence." If implemented, this would have amounted to a 
membership on paper only for the applicants. U.S. Secreta!)' of state 
Albright declared NATO had no plans to station nuclear weapons or sub-
stantial combat forces on the territory of the new members." This was in-
tended to placate Russian apprehensions. Moreover, it would make it politi-
cally costly for Russia to deploy nuclear arms in adjacent areas like the 
Kaliningrad enclave. By December 1996, tensions had cooled and Primakov 
declared that Russia was interested in an open dialogue with NATO. 83 
Partly to allay Moscow's reactions to the planned enlargement, plans were 
made to give the relationship between NATO and Russia a new footing. It 
was known that Russia regarded a mere PfP-relationship as insufficient, 
since this would not reflect Russia's importance and weight in European 
security. The Russian viewpoint was therefore that bilateral relations should 
be given a formal framework where NATO acknowledged this special role. 
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This led to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Secu-
rity signed between NATO and Russia in May 1997. At the time of signing, 
this was considered as an important mechanism for regularising contacts 
and dialogue. The Act also opened up for the establishment of the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council where security matters of mutual interest 
could be addressed. 
Western and Russian politicians presented this as a breakthrough, but for 
widely differing reasons. NATO regarded the establishment of the Council 
as a first step towards regularised contacts with Russia on European secu-
rity issues. The Russian leadership equated the Council with access to influ-
ence NATO decisions. In Poland, this interpretation caused anxiety. It was 
feared that Russia now could postpone enlargement. But according to 
MadeleineAlbright, what had been agreed in the Founding Act, gave Russia 
"no opportunity to dilute, delay or blockNATOdecisions".84 Financial Times 
wrote" ... western diplomats freely acknowledge, it [the Pact, KDM) could 
mean nothing at all." 
Hardly had the new relationship been regularised before NATO's war 
against Yugoslavia started in March 1999. Russia responded by severing all 
contacts with the Alliance as well as bilateral security projects with NATO 
members. Poland was partner to no bilateral projects, and was therefore not 
directly affected. 
The new military doctrine 
The bilateral relations between Warsaw and Moscow are influenced by the 
changing modes in Russia's relationship with NATO.According to a Polish 
journalist, the Russian political elite, irrespective of political hue, has long 
regarded Poland as a loyal American satellite." Polish security politics were 
at best influenced indirectly, as a result ofRussian dealings with NATO. As 
far as can be ascertained from interviews and written material, Russia has 
not raised issues pertaining solely to Polish foreign and security dispositions 
during meetings in the Joint Council since its establishment in 1997. As men-
tioned previously, scant attention was paid to Poland with one important ex-
ception. Polish attempts to play a regional role, i.e. advocating closer links 
between NATO and Ukraine as well as Baltic membership, have provoked 
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Moscow's ire at regular intervals. But this has mostly been done through 
newspaper articles. In bilateral relations, Moscow has during the last years 
refrained from trying to exert pressure against Poland's policies on these 
issues.86 
To gather an impression of how Russia perceives Poland, the Russian 
Military Doctrine signed by president Putin inApril2000 provides valuable 
insight" The Doctrine is an official Russian view of the strategic situation in 
the regions bordering Russia, and the policies deemed adequate for further-
ing Russian interests. The rapprochement between Moscow and NATO in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks in USA, may have rendered part of the 
Doctrine obsolete. But since the Doctrine was the result of a lengthy proc-
ess and hard bargaining between the parties involved, it may still be indica-
tive of how Russia's security is perceived by influential organs like the gen-
eral staff and the ministry of defence. 
The Doctrine heralded a shift in perceptions away from the emphasis put 
on co-operation with NATO in vogue at the time of signing the NATO-
Russia Founding Act in 1997. 13 different factors representing threats are 
listed in the Doctrine.Bere, NATO plays a prominent part in that "[t]he 
expansion of military blocks and alliances to the disadvantage of the military 
security of Russia", and "[t]he establishment/reinforcement of armed units 
affecting the balance of forces close to the borders of Russia and the bor-
ders of her allies as well as in the adjacent maritime areas," both refer to 
NATO." What should be noticed here is the careful phrasing, instead of 
'bordering Russia', the phrase chosen is "close to". Poland fits both catego-
ries, but the term "close to" is sufficiently vague to refer not only to Poland 
but to the rest of Central Europe as well. The list also contains a re-ference 
to" ... training, equipping and preparing troops in other countries for deploy-
ment on Russian territory or on the territory ofRussia's allies."'" This may 
relate to developments in Central Asia, primarily the training oflslamic fun-
damentalists in countries likeMghanistan and their raids into Tajikistan, a 
Russian ally. But it may also be taken as an expression of the Russian mili-
tary leadership's opposition to PfP, and the ensuing military co-operation 
with the Alliance."' 
This position reflected in the quotations rendered above, affects Poland 
in two ways. Firstly, Polish attempts to develop closer links with Lithuania 
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and Ukraine are interpreted as representing a threat to Russia. Secondly, if 
Poland were to allow the stationing of allied troops on Polish territory, it 
would be regarded as a menace to Russia. Russia could retaliate by increas-
ing its military presence in Belarus. 
A further indicator of change is the differences in style and content when 
comparing the 2000 version with its predecessor dating from 1993. The 1993 
version had emphasised the need to preserve the neutrality of the former 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe." Any changes in this status would be 
perceived as a change in the European security balance and as a threat to 
Russia. 
The 1993 document had been severely criticised by military leaders as 
being too influenced by romantic preconceptions of the West and exagger-
ated hopes for co-operation. The armed forces refused to accept the docu-
ment's main intentions, lobbying instead for the adoption of a new doctrine. 
They were supported by the ministry of defence which joined them in press-
ing for an entirely opposite approach. 
Only towards the end of September 1999 did the Ministry of Defence 
announce that a new military doctrine was being finalised." Yet, due to the 
criticism voiced against it from military quarters, it soon became clear that 
publication would be further delayed." The changes in NATO doctrine, 
enlargement and the closer degree of co-operation with former Soviet allies 
in the Baltic region and on the Balkans had not been taken sufficiently into 
account. 
Only at the beginning ofJ anuary 2000 was the preliminary version of the 
new "Conception ofNational Security'' approved by president Putin and 
disseminated among a select number of institutions for final adjustments." 
Putin signed the final version 21 April." 
Putin justified the need for a new doctrine by referring to the unstable 
situation in the Caucasus, and NATO's attack against Yugoslavia which had 
occurred without the prior approval of the UN Security Council. Although 
the Doctrine was presented as an attempt to adjust to new international sur-
roundings, the text contained numerous passages that revealed not so much 
an adaptation as a relapse back to the threat perceptions of the Cold War. 
The 1993 version had started with a preamble stating that ideological con-
frontation was waning as the result of varied efforts made to increase inter-
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national co-operation and reduce risks. Apparently, intentions were to com-
pel the Russian military to distinguish between threats and dangers, and con-
centrate their efforts on countering the latter. In the 2000 version, both pre-
amble and distinction, and the resultant need to prioritise, have been deleted. 
Instead, the necessity of increasing military and security co-operation with 
Russia's allies was emphasised. 
The importance of Belarus 
The actual identity of 'Russia s allies' referred to in the Doctrine is never 
explicitly listed with the exception ofBelarus. Other countries intended may 
originally have denoted the signatories to the 1992 Tashkent Agreement on 
military and security co-operation under the auspices of CIS. In addition to 
Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan endorsed it.96 But this is a motley assembly and 
military co-operation is proceeding at very different levels. 
Only Belarus is given a separate and rather lengthy treatment in the text. 
In the section entitled "Military-political conditions", priority is to be given 
to "the implementation of a joint defence policy with Belarus, the co-ordina-
tion of the development of armed forces and military infrastructure ofboth 
Union states"." This is a recent addition to the Doctrine, as late as 1999 the 
draft text did not mention Belarus. 
Belarus is the only country where the leader has tied his policies closely 
to a strong Russian military presence, being fully aware of the strategic 
value of his country as Russia's Western outpost. This was clearly ex-
pressed in a speech given by the Belorussian president Alexandr 
Lukashenka: 
38 
The Belorussian army is the only thing Russia has in the west. And I say 
it does not need anything else, because we shall guarantee security in 
the west both to Belarus and to Russia, provided the Russian armed 
forces give us certain assistance. 98 
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Russlan·Belorussian military co-operation 
Russian-Belorussian military co-operation antedates the publication of the 
Doctrine. In fact, it was never severed completely despite the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. . 
Before that, Belarus was the most heavily militarised Soviet republic both 
in terms of military installations and the share of defence industry in ~e na-
tional economy. After independence, Russian military presence remamed 
strong. An agreement permitting the stationing of25,000 Russian soldiers 
was signed soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union." This number was 
most probably exceeded as numerous soldiers were stranded in Belarus en 
route from Central and Eastern Europe. But this was a temporary phenom-
enon. The current level of Russian military personnel in Belarus seems to be 
lying in the range of2000 men. Close to all are involved either in the con-
struction or manning of radar installations."' 
In January 1995, a new formal basis was provided with the signing of 
several intra-governmental agreements. They listed the conditions for Rus-
sian usage of military installations in Belarus for the next 25 years. A mo~th 
later, president Yeltsin went to Minsk and signed further agre.:men~s, wh~ch 
gave Russia the mandate of guarding the country's borders With Lithuania, 
Ukraine and Poland. Exactly how this agreement is implemented remains a 
subject of conjecture. Claims that Russian soldiers wou_ld assu~e responsi-
bility for physically guarding and patrolling the Beloruss1an-Pohsh border 
seem unfounded. 
In 1999, the two countries signed an agreement merging the air com-
mands of the two countries. Joint air and air defence exercises have taken 
place not in Belarus, but in the Kaliningrad Region, the official expl~ation 
being that Belarus lacked adequate training ground.101 At the same t1m~, the 
establishment of a joint military force of approx. 300,000 men was envis-
aged. Apparently, a third would be Belorussian soldiers, with the remaining 
200,000 being Russian. Yet, in this case, as in numerous others, Lukash~nka 
seems to have forgotten to clear this with his Russian counterparts. Th1s . 
may explain why, when addressing the Union Assembly of the two countries 
a month later, he presented a di~uted version. This time_ he claimed tha~ an~ 
military contribution from Russia would not be automatically forthcommg. 
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The question remains how strong is Russia's commitment. Although 
Lukashenka has persistently attempted to extract concrete promises from 
Putin leading to a closer union, no breakthrough has occurred. For Belarus, 
the most pressing problems are in the field of trade where the need for Rus-
sian investments is particularly acute. Yet, even in military matters where 
Russian interests in maintaining control ofBelarus are undoubted, Putin 
seems unwilling to make any concrete commitments beyond those areas 
that clearly serve Russian needs. Examples are Russian involvement in 
Belorussian armaments production and the construction of military installa-
tions on Belorussian territory. 
Current Russian construction activities include the building of air defence 
radars in Baranivichi and the sub-marine tracking system in Vileyka.'" 
Steps have been taken to engineer a replacement for the old Skrunda radar 
dismantled when Latvia gained independence. This left Russia with a gap in 
the early-warning radar network. The construction of the new Volga radar 
in Belarus will mitigate this loss. The value of this radar has increased not 
least due to the declining efficiency of the space-based network ofOko and 
Prognoz early-warning satellites.'" The last Prognoz satellite was shot into 
space in 1998 without any replacement available. In the case ofOko, the 
optimal number of satellites in orbit is 9. This has rarely been achieved, the 
normal state seems to have been four satellites. No upgrading seems to be 
forthcoming, and any plans in this respect suffered a severe setback with 
the fire in the command centre in May 200 I. A ground-based radar is 
cheaper, and therefore far more reliable than satellites. 
Poland, Belarus and regional stability 
The close relationship between Russia and Belarus assures the latter a spe-
cial place in Polish eastern policy. Russian military constructions and the 
close alignment in military and security matters only enhances Polish appre-
hensions. In addition, Belarus illustrates that it is possible to make a complete 
volte-face, dismantle reforms and go back to a model uncannily similar to the 
one in existence before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having done that, the 
Belorussian leadership has promoted itself as a rallying point for undemocratic 
forces in neighbouring Ukraine. The Polish government regards the country 
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as a source of regional instability, a perception shared by their colleagues in 
K yiv and Vilnius.'" 
The Russian sentiment that Central Europe has been lost is to a certain 
extent mirrored in Poland albeit with focus given to Belarus.'"' After inde-
pendence was gained upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in !991, con-
tacts with Poland expanded at all levels involving politicians, academic insti-
tution~ local government and ordinary citizens. Poland was the link to the West 
This development did not last long. Polish-Belorussian relations rapidly 
became difficult after president Lukashenka assumed power in Minsk in 
1994.Although winning the elections on an anti-corruption ticket, he rapidly 
declared himself against the reformist policies ofhis predecessor. Instead, 
the solutions were to be closer co-operation with Russia. 
After Lukashenka dissolved Parliament in 1996, the presidents ofPo-
land, Lithuania and Ukraine issued a joint protest. This was a unique exam-
ple of trilateral unanimity. The three countries have later adopted policies 
towards Belarus reflecting the differences in their relationship with the West 
and Russia. 
Lithuania is economically more dependent on Belarus than Poland. Until 
quite recently, Lithuania has exported considerable quantities of agricultural 
products, consumer goods and electricity to Belarus. Belorussian payment 
arrears have meant that this trade has dwindled rapidly and thus deprived 
Lithuania of significant export earnings. Moreover, despite Lithuanian 
urgings, the Belorussian authorities have protracted the fmal demarcation of 
the common border. Lithuania has therefore opted for a more low-key ap-
proach than Poland. 
The Ukrainian president has occasionally criticised internal developments 
in Belarus, but more often made his apprehensions of the close security co-
operation between Minsk and Moscow known. Russian control over Belarus 
was a source of instability and meant that closer co-operation between K yiv 
and NATO was the only option left to Ukraine to balance Russian regional 
designs.'" 
Poland has soughtto attract international attention to the developments in 
Belarus. During the Polish chairmanship of the OSCE from 1998, Lukashenka's 
attacks on democracy featured regularly on the agenda. This had little, if any 
effects. Polish media covers the fate of the Polish minority and the Catholic 
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Church regularly. Security experts and military leaders in Warsaw focus on 
Russia's military involvement. Especially during the debate on Polish army 
restructuring, the question of whether Poland possessed sufficient resources 
to resist a combined Russian attack from Belarus and the Kaliningrad en-
clave was raised. But Russian presence in Belarus has so far remained 
rather modest, despite the grand statements regularly issued by the leader-
ship in Minsk. 
Kaliningrad 
At the beginning ofJanuary 2001, U.S. officials claimed that Russia had 
moved tactical nuclear weapons to the Kaliningrad enclave.'" Polish reac-
tions were initially quite alarmist, only to become more subdued later on. In 
an official statement issued by the Polish Ministry ofForeignAffairs, earlier 
demands for the right to inspection issued in the wake of the US reports 
were retracted."' If nothing else, the sudden and short-lived flurry of news~ 
paper articles has served to underline the relevance of d~velop~en~ _in the 
Kaliningrad enclave for Poland. Poland's basic problem ts that tts abthtyto 
influence developments in the enclave is virtually non-existent. A co-opera-
tion agreement was signed in 1992, only to be replaced by a new agreement 
and a council devoted to cross-border border co-operation. These have 
failed to yield any noticeable results. Kaliningrad has remained, to quote a 
Polish headline "the big unknown".'" 
Polish efforts to raise these issues with Moscow have been met with a 
negative response. One of the few points where the Russian leadership has 
been willing to address Kaliningrad in bilateral negotiations has concerned 
communications between the regions and Russia proper. Russian access 
across Polish territory first became a difficult topic after the Soviet army 
had been withdrawn from Polish territory. The government has refused to 
give Russian authorities permission for the transfer of military equipment 
across Polish territory. The only route open to Russia is across Lithuania. 
Polish failures to elicit a Russian response to the faltering conditions in 
Kaliningrad is not only due to Russian refusal to discuss internal matters with 
a foreign state, but may be ascribed to lack of an official Russian policy on 
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the future fate of the enclave. The local political leadership in Kaliningrad 
has favoured the establishment of a so-called "special economic zone" to 
attract foreign investments. The military has stubbornly and successfully 
resisted all such attempts. When the former commander-in-chief of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov was elected governor ofthe 
province in November2000, one Polish commentator remarked that whereas 
the civilian side is dreaming of a Baltic Hong Kong, the military is turning the 
region into a Russian equivalent of the U.S. Guantanamo base on Cuba.'" 
Polish abilities to stabilise developments in the enclave are clearly limited. 
The only option for Poland is regional co-operation. Bytransformingdevel-
opments in the Kaliningrad enclave into an issue for multilateral efforts, the 
chances of achieving an improvement in local conditions increase. This at-
tempt has been tried, yet without yielding any grand results so far. But is 
should be noted that the Kaliningrad authorities are committed to co-operat-
ing with Poland as much as possible. When Moscow broke off security co-
operation with NATO and its members, a move that had adverse effects on 
co-operation in other sectors as well, bilateral co-operation between Kalinin-
grad and Poland was not affected.'" 
The only regional organisation where both Poland and Russia are mem-
bers is the Baltic Council. Yet, initiatives taken here have regularly stranded 
on lack ofRussian engagement.'" The reason may be that the Council is 
regarded as an impotent club serving as little more than a discussion forum. 
The EU is not and will therefore have a greater chance of success. 
Chris Patten, EU commissioner for external relations, voiced his concern 
over the future of the enclave in January2001 after the EU had produced a 
report on the region's position once enlargement had been implemented.'" 
Patten listed a number of projects aimed at supporting the development of 
the region. Prominent among these were the facilitating of visa issuance and 
border crossings. Patten 's initiative occurred almost simultaneously with 
demonstrations in Kaliningrad against the Russian leadership's neglect of the 
region's needs. 
From a Polish perspective, the issue at stake here is not so much Kalinin-
grad and the EU, but rather that the EU has recognised the problems posed 
by the Schengen Agreement imposing strict rules on border crossings. Yet, 
that is far from saying that the EU will relax visa regulations. Lithuanian 
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authorities have long hoped that the lenient regulations would allow transit 
passengers from Kaliningrad en route to Belarus and Russia to cross 
Lithuanian territory without a formal visa. Butthis would contravene 
Schengen, and from 2003 visas will be made mandatory. 11 ' 
After the Report was published, Patten went to Moscow to inform the Rus-
sian government on the conclusions drawn, and would then await "the Rus-
sian government's ideas on the rnatter."116 So far, an official Russian re-
sponse has not been forthcoming. 
Lithuania 
Poland's current relationship with Lithuania spans a wide range of activities 
and has been extensively institutionalised. Military and security co-operation 
plays a prominent role. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, conditions were quite the opposite and 
little indicated that rapprochement would develop to the extent it has. Until it 
became clear that good neighbourly relations would be a merit for any NATO 
applicants, official contacts were few. Indeed, the relationship between Po-
land and Lithuania was regarded as a regional source of instability by West-
em observers.117 
One of the reasons was the Polish minority in the country, some 260,000 
or 7 per cent of Lithuania's population. When the Lithuanian popular front 
Sajudis started to work for Lithuanian independence during the late I 980s, 
the Polish minority did not offer its support. They feared that independence 
from Moscow would pave the way for anti-Polish sentiments. 
The government in Warsaw was compelled to establish relations with 
Lithuania. Warsaw wanted to provide support for the Polish minority while 
at the same time avoid being seen as interfering in internal Lithuanian af-
fairs. This proved a difficult balancing act and may account for the slow 
progress of relations. In January 1992, a Declaration of Friendly Relations 
and Good-Neighbourly Co-operation was signed by the two countries' for-
eign ministers. The Declaration was little more than a formal statement of 
intent, no areas were prioritised, and more importantly, neither party seemed 
willing to invest time or resources. This made the relationship between the 
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two countries something of an anomaly at the time. During the following two 
years, the Declaration lay dormant and virtually no progress was made. 
Yet, the situation was set to change, not least because of the Polish mi-
nority in Lithuania, but also Western pressure requiring the states to settle 
their historical grievances. An inter-state Treaty was signed as late as spring 
I 994, making Lithuania the last ofPoland's neighbours where this was done. 
In I 997, the relationship was upgraded and called a strategic partnership, and 
expanded to include a joint Parliamentary Assembly, a Consultative Commit-
tee of Presidents, and a Council for Inter-Governmental Co-operation.118 
Military co-operation with Poland and the West 
Lithuania seeks to emulate the Polish membership strategy. International co-
operation, PfP activities and upgrading the armed forces are all regarded as 
steps towards membership. And if this strategy should fail, these reforms 
would enhance their chances ofNATO assistance should any threat to their 
security emerge. 
Polish efforts to develop relations with Lithuania have been facilitated by 
both countries' relationship with Denmark. The Danish government has 
pursued an active policy towards the Baltic states, but has gradually concen-
trated on the relationship with Lithuania. At the same time, political contacts 
between Denmark and Poland have increased considerably, not least in the 
field of security and military co-operation. Lithuanian politicians regard this. 
kind of triangular co-operation a suitable mechanism for developing closer 
contacts with the West while at the same time avoiding complete depend-
ence on Poland. Nevertheless, Polish-Lithuanian military co-operation has 
gained its own dynamics. Co-operation has been given an impetus thanks to 
NATO's increasingly positive evaluations ofLithuanian defence and security 
policy. And finally, Lithuania has been mentioned as one of the few potential 
markets for Polish armaments. 11 ' 
Poland and Lithuania are in the process of establishing a joint battalion 
labelled LITPOLBAT. Some financial assistance is being provided by NATO 
and by NATO countries. Much like Poland at the beginning of the 1990s, 
Lithuania is receiving aid from the USA in the form of surplus material and 
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upgrading of extant equipment. This concerns in particular communication 
systems, anti-nuclear and anti chemical protection capabilities, and the es-
tablishment of an English language training centre. 
Polish attempts to integrate Lithuania into NATO processes and projects 
have since the late 1990s run parallel to other allied efforts directed towards 
the region. A so-called Baltic Assistance Group (Baltsea) has been estab-
lished to serve as co-ordinator. The efficiency of this body is difficult to as-
sess. Many bilateral projects, exchanges of personnel, transfer of equipment 
seem to take place without the involvement of the Centre. The U.S. Office 
for Defence Co-operation has local representatives in the three U.S. em-
bassies. The most notable achievements so far have been the creation of a 
Baltic naval squadron (Baltron). Since 1998, it has undertaken mine sweep-
ing exercises. 
Norway and the USA have jointly funded a regional air space surveil-
lance control centre called Baltnet. The centre is located at Karmelava in 
Lithuania. Here, data from radars in all three Baltic states are collected, 
processed and transferred to NATO headquarters.!'• 
In June 1999, the Baltic Defence College (Baltdefcol) was opened in 
Tartu, Estonia. Instructors are from the West, though not necessarily NATO 
countries. The intention is to provide NATO-level education on strategy, 
operations and tactics, logistics, staff management and administration, mili-
tary technology and total defence. This will enhance the countries' ability to 
co-operate militarily with NATO. Polish officers have also been invited to 
participate in the courses. But apart from providing the occasional lecturer, 
interest among officers has been dismal. In 2000, no Polish officers partici-
pated.!'' The reasons provided were, as a Polish journalist observed, the 
usual, spanning fmancial, organisational and linguistic barriers. 122 
However, none seem insurmountable. Costs are moderate. If partici-
pants are unable to cover expenses, NATO provides funding. Claiming that 
the usage ofEnglish is a deterrence against participation is nothing short of 
embarrassing, Polish officers have benefited from extensive English coach-
ing funded by NATO since the mid 90s. The failure of Poland to participate 
illustrates what Zdzislaw Znajder has referred to as typical Polish political 
"verbalism", a strong rhetoric emphasis on co-operation resulting in few 
concrete measures.'" The long-term implications for Poland in this concrete 
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case should not be overlooked. Poland's credibility as an intermediary for 
Lithuania may be weakened in the eyes of other NATO countries. Like-
wise, Polish complaints that NATO's attention is excessively focused on 
either Russia or the Balkans, and insufficiently directed to the Baltic, lose 
clout when Poland can be accused of failing to take advantage of the chan-
nels offered. 
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Military and strategic implications 
Polish membership occurred at a time when NATO was undergoing a radi-
cal transformation. The new Strategic Concept passed in April 1999 empha-
sised the possibility of operations outside the membership countries. This 
called for significant changes in training and equipment of the Alliance, and 
in particular the need for the European members to upgrade their equipment 
to maintain interoperabilitywith the Americans.'" 
These momentous changes may explain why so little attention was paid 
to the consequences of accepting new members that militarily were far below 
Alliance levels. NATO may have believed that the growing number ofP£P 
projects enabled officials in Brussels to form a fairly accurate picture ofthe 
extent of the problems. This neglect was highlighted in 1997 when each of 
the prospective members was obliged to complete a detailed Defence Plan-
ning Questionnaire (DPQ). By late October, the three had returned them 
thus enabling NATO to make an evaluation. 
The information provided caused concern in NAT0.125 Although all 
countries were subjected to criticism, the 43-page long Assessment of Poland 
drew particularly damning conclusions concerning the army. It was charac-
terised by "widespread and significant interoperability deficiencies". If these 
problems were not solved, they would "substantially limit its combat capac-
ity" .126 The Assessment further contained scathing remarks on the modest 
reforms that were being implemented. Even allowing for the improvements 
that were made in the following two years, the main conclusion that Poland 
militarily was a burden remained valid by 1999. The criticism voiced was a 
setback for Poland. Polish politicians had stated that they wanted to partici-
pate fully in the Alliance, but without soldiers up to the task, this amounted to 
little more than political intentions. Reforms were initiated to erase the ob-
jects of criticism. 
This chapter presents these efforts and evaluates the outcome. It will 
start with a survey of the first efforts made to assess the needs of the Polish 
armed forces. The contents of these reforms are not as interesting as why 
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they failed. The reasons are by no means solely a thing of the pre-member-
ship era, but have continued to mar military restructuring ever since. 
Although Poland had applied for NATO membership, an entrance date 
remained elusive. Donations of Western equipment were made, on an in-
creasing scale one might add, but most plans indicated that upgrading would 
have to rely on domestic production. This affected Polish defeoce industry, 
at the time a major employer wielding considerable political clout. The de-
fence lobby has remained powerful, despite numerous attempts to curb its 
influence. Although domestic production seemed like a cheaper option than 
Western imports despite the latter's superior quality and significant signal 
effect, another option was to continue co-operation with Russian manufac-
turers and jointly undertake upgrading of the mainly Soviet-made equipment 
used by Poland. Why this option fell will be discussed. 
The main part of the chapter focuses on current reform work. After a 
discussion ofNATO's difficult role as advisor, a brief summary of changes 
in army, air force and navy is given. Reforming the secret services tuned out 
to be an unexpectedly difficult and lengthy process. 
Poland participated in NATO peacekeeping in Kosovo in the wake ofthe 
war against Yugoslavia. The ability to do that had been made possible by the 
ongoing reforms. The attempts to secure both the location of a sub-regional 
headquarters on Polish territory as well as having a special contingency plan 
drawn up for Poland, have failed. Why will be discussed, before ending with 
a discussion on possible task specialisation for Poland. 
It may be necessary to add that we are at a very early point in the proc-
ess. But as will be shown here, reforms have been discussed and imple-
mented often and long enough by now to make a discussion of some funda-
mental obstacles possible. 
Assessing needs and splitting the bill 
The DPQ' and follow-up studies provided a detailed presentation ofthe 
state of Polish defence. The conclusions drawn defined the direction of sub-
sequent reforms and should therefore be repeated here. 
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The state of the navy was decried and deemed to be particularly grave. 
Only a few vessels were "capable of more distant deployment beyond Po-
land's coastal region and the Baltic Sea".'" Moreover, the modest reforms 
initiated by the government were not expected to lead to any appreciable 
improvements. Condition of the harbour facilities, including fuel depots and 
repair docks were painted in black colours as well. 
Concerning the air force, the Soviet-made MiG fighters were in need of 
radical and costly improvements in orderto reach interoperability levels. More-
over, it was noted that combat readiness was low, and airlift capacity close to 
non-existent. None of the Polish air bases had equipment for handling cargo. 
The army's tactical reconnaissance resources were very modest. Neither 
air force radars nor navigation equipment was capable of exchanging data 
with NATO countries. Moreover, none of the country's airfields, and the 
country had been endowed with 55, were connected to a fuel pipeline sys-
tem. Some of these problems could be solved through NATO infrastructure 
grants. Even with rather generous allocations from NATO, only the most 
urgent priorities would be met. How all the deficiencies revealed in the wake 
of the DPQ would be met was left unmentioned, let alone how the bill should 
be split. 
Splitting the bill became a contentious issue within the Alliance during the 
latter half of the 1990s. Different attempts were made at designing a key that 
would keep all parties satisfied. That turned out to be impossible not least 
since opinions on enlargement were divided. The member states did not agree 
on which countries to accept, and accordingly the willingness to pay for other 
members' favourites was, politely said, rather modest. Not suprisingly, the 
discussion could hardly avoid being entangled in the ongoing debate on bur-
den sharing within the Alliance. Especially within the US Congress, many 
felt that the Europeans should contribute a large share since enlargement was 
perceived primarily as an enhancement of the European NATO members' 
safety. But finally, it was difficult to agree on what should be prioritised and 
therefore funded within the foreseeable future. Some estimates even envis-
aged major upgrading in the NATO countries bordering the new members 
since they could be required to provide military assistance to the three new 
entrants. Thus, any cost assessment made unavoidably became entangled in 
the political debate. Suffice it here to quote the main numbers presented by 
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the three most important studies made by the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, RAND corporation, and the US State Department respectively. 
The study by the Congressional Budget Office was published in March 
1996 as the first of the three.'" Expansion cost would be in the range be-
tween $61 and $125 bill. The distance between the two extremes reflects 
the lack of precise knowledge on the state of the applicants' defence sectors 
as well as the need to take a wide range of threat scenarios and what an 
adequate response would be into account. The study published by RAND in 
the autumn the same year focused on the different military options available 
for NATO: e.g. major upgrading of the new members' defence sector, NATO 
bases etc.'" According to the options chosen, costs would lie between $40 
and $60 billion, of these the applicant countries were expected to cover $8 
billion. In July the following year, the ClintonAdministration presented a cost 
estimate compiled by both the State Department and the Defence Depart-
ment.'" The bill would lie between $27 and $35 billion. It was stated that the 
US would cover I 0 per cent of this sum. The European allies and the new 
entrants would cover the rest This estimate was not well received in Europe. 
First of all, there had been no discussion in NATO on how the bill would be 
split, and the US Administration seemed to be getting off rather cheaply 
especially when considering that enlargement had been pushed far more 
vigorously in Washington than in many European countries. Secondly, the 
sums did not inspire confidence. They seemed incredibly low. The French 
president, dismayed that Slovenia and Romania were not accepted among 
the frrst-wave entrants, declared at the Madrid Summit in 1997, that France 
would not provide any of the means necessary to pay for enlargement. This 
was hardly an endearing position seen from Warsaw. 
But France was not alone in being critical. The German government 
consistently opted for the cheapest solutions and low-cost scenarios, the 
British Ministry of Defence toyed with the idea that enlargement costs 
should be financed from member countries' contributions to NATO infra-
structure projects. To complicate the issue even further, opinions in the US 
Congress were in favour of pressing the Europeans to pay the main burden, 
as was reflected in the division of costs suggested by the US administration. 
These different proposals notwithstanding, all agreed that the final sum 
needed to achieve compatibility depended on the state of the new members' 
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milital)' hardware. But little was known about this. Another element of un-
certainty concerned the new entrants' will to foot the bill. It could not be 
taken for granted that the parliaments in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest would 
be willing to increase defence budgets at a time when economic problems and 
social needs required immediate, and costly solutions. 
This led to worries that once membership was assured, the political re-
solve to finance upgrading would wane. The Czech Republic proved to be a 
sal uta!)' warning. When the matter of the dismal state of equipment used by 
· the Czech army was raised, 1prime minister V aclav Klaus stated that this 
problem was "really secondary" since joining NATO was a political ques-
tion.131 Only the Polish government presented a detailed report correcting 
some of the data presented in various Western assessments."' Politicians 
and researchers doubted the American estimates and produced their own. m 
With the benefit ofhindsight, calculations from both sides of the Atlantic have 
proved wrong. Yet, the essential point here is that the Polish government soon 
drafted a plan for upgrading. It represented an improvement upon western 
calculations in that it attempted to break down future spending on a yearly 
basis with detailed specifications of v.here the sums should be spent The RAND 
calculations did not do that, instead lumping the sums together."' Apart from 
lacking precision, it made any debate on the feasibility of the calculations 
difficult 
The plans were ambitious and intended to impress both foreign observers 
and the domestic audience. In the first case this was easily done. But the 
domestic appeal of the programme should not be underestimated. In the 
months preceding membership, the press had written extensively about the 
dismal state of defence, morale in the armed forces and the lack of suffi-
cient manpower, in particular pilots, and modem equipment. It was pointed 
out that the rapprochement with NATO had resulted in a spot-wise mod-
ernisation where only those units allocated for co-operation with NATO had 
been granted sufficient resources."' 
Thus, upgrading had been highly selective. The authors behind the RAND 
study wrote in autumn 1997 that NATO would have to decide "How much 
of the NATO defence package should be in place on the day of accession 
and how much can the Alliance afford to build once these countries have 
already joined?"136 The authors further remarked that this issue had been 
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largely ignored. No explicit decision in the form of an entrance formula that 
had to be fulfilled before membership was made. The need to reach the 
closest degree of interoperability was repeated by both sides in official docu-
ments, political declarations and official speeches. Butthis did not mean that 
they agreed on how interoperability was best achieved. NATO emphasised 
human resources and allocated money to training of officers. This was per-
ceived as the basic requirements that had to be fulfilled before issues like 
upgrading and purchases of new equipment were to be addressed. Polish 
officials tended to focus on the latter possibly believing that import ofWest-
ern, especially US-made equipment would not only serve as a manifest ex-
pression of interoperability, but also as a proof of their political sympathies.137 
Western donations 
The different estimates presented all agreed on one point, it could not be 
expected that Poland would be able to come up with the funding required to 
pay for the upgrading. Western assistance was bound to play an important 
role. 
During the PfP-years, Poland like the other countries in the region re-
ceived gifts in the form of externally funded training. These would either be 
language courses and lectures conducted in the PfP country or the offering 
of in the West, in particular at the NATO School in Oberammergau in Ger-
many. The latter came to increase considerably in the course of the 1990s 
with the U.S. as the largest host country. 
Upgrading human resources has been a protracted affair. But the man-
agement and co-ordination required to make this process run smoothly, are 
not particularly exacting. Most is, as indicated above, conducted in foreign 
countries, leaving the Polish side with the task of finding qualified candi-
dates. Western assistance in the form of gifts posed quite another challenge. 
Already early in the 1990s, Poland received equipment from several west-
ern countries. But as a rule, the donor countries offered only equipment they 
had exchanged for something more efficient. Thus, Poland was left with 
yesterday's version. Although it resulted in spot-wise upgrading of some 
sectors in Polish defence, it was hardly the key to a generally enhanced 
interoperability with NATO. It should rather be understood as attempts to 
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gain a foothold in what was at the time believed to be a promising market 
for Western armaments. 
These activities, labelled 'military tourism' by some, were inadequate.138 
But the Polish recipients were not in a strong bargaining position. Rejecting 
the offers could harm their standing in NATO, and with the critical reviews 
increasing in the period following the leakage ofthe DPQ results, they felt 
obliged to accept all that was offered. 
This deferential attitude has changed since 1999. Part of the explanation 
is a change in Polish negotiation behaviour. Instead of passively receiving all 
that was on offer, they are now more capable offormulating their own pri-
orities and choosing among what the western countries can offer. Poland is 
now in a position to choose among several offers. One of the consequences 
has been that smaller, and less important allies like Denmark end up in a 
situation where their offer is compared with that made by other allies, forc-
ing them to be willing to adapt to accommodate Polish priorities. As such, 
this development should be welcomed since it ensures a more efficient use 
of Western assistance than was occasionally the case at the beginning of 
the 1990s. In addition, Western co-operation has changed away from dona-
tions to industrial co-operation and regular sales. 
The issue of sales attracted considerable Western attention during the 
early 1990s. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, researchers at the Centre for 
War Economics at the University ofYork, emphasise increased weapons 
sale from the original NATO members to the new entrants as a potential 
enlargement benefit 139 The new member states were at times described as 
the "last market'' for Western producers. With the end of the Cold War, sales 
had dwindled. Poland ranked high on the list of potential customers. This was 
not only due to its size, but to Polish ambitions ofbecoming a full NATO 
member as soon as possible. If that was to happen, Poland would have to 
rely on imports. 
Poland and European Defence Industry 
Reliance on imports became a hotly disputed topic in Polish debate.140 As a 
legacy from the Warsaw Pact, the country had a sizeable defence industrial 
base. Before joining, some believed that NATO membership would guaran-
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tee the survival of the country's armaments industry. Others regarded the 
prospects in a much more sombre light, believing that the negative trends 
experienced throughout the 1990s would continue with procurement orders 
bypassing domestic producers. 
One of the reasons was the lack of change at enterprise level. Output 
changed little despite diminishing sales. Production plans made at a time when 
membership was little more than a possibility, were not shelved despite the 
growing rapprochement between Poland and NATO during the latter half of 
the 1990s. The expensive plans for a new generation of the Gorilla (Gory!) 
battle tank made at the beginning of the decade may be taken as an illustra-
tion. Despite the criticism focusing both on costs and the fact that light ar-
moured vehicles would be more adequate; a prototype was developed.141 It 
should be added that the criticism was not only forthcoming from those sec-
tions of the defence establishment and commentators that were concerned 
about interoperabilitywith NATO, but NATO officials had also emphasised 
that what was called for was mobility, i.e. light armoured vehicles, to their 
Polish colleagues on several occasions.142 Minister of defence Janusz 
Onyszkewicz agreed, and stated that the output of Polish armaments enter-
prises would have to change, but implied at the same time that it was up to 
the enterprises to seize the opportunity and adapt to the new needs.143 But 
he warned that this kind of modernisation would mean less reliance on 
heavy industry, a major employer. 
Neither has happened One might instead argue along the lines ofPolish re-
formers and senior defence officials and claim that too little has been done. 144 
In their view, the country remains burdened with an oversized armaments 
sector incapable of modernisation depending not so much on the military as 
on local politicians for their survival. Most agree that this situation cannot 
continue, and that armaments much like the rest of the country's enterprises 
will have to find their niche in the European market. Poland has some com-
parative advantages that might entice western investors and partners, ad-
vantages that are not limited to the civilian sector. These include low produc-
tion costs and a skilled labour force. 
But the issue of weapons sale should be expanded somewhat to mention 
the possibilities of joint production. As mentioned previously, this possibility 
was explored by some Western enterprises with dismal results. One of the 
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main causes, the lack of a predictable framework for the Polish armaments 
producers and a clear delineation of state responsibility and ownership, is 
being changed through privatisation, sell-offs and closures. This may also 
reduce the clout of the industrial lobby in controlling procurement. Subse-
quently this may open up for industrial co-operation with Polish enterprises. 
Another reason why this may be a more feasible option today than it was at 
the beginning of the 1990s concerns the changes on the Polish side. A dec-
ade ago, most Western industrial ventures in Poland concentrated mainly on 
assembly line production with R&D work conducted in the western partner 
plant. As a result, the Polish enterprise lacked tasks that could assure the 
retention of its own technical staff, let alone entice new. This problem had 
become less acute. Today, many armaments producers manufacture a wide 
range of civilian products and are thus able keep personnel involved in R&D 
on the payroll even in times without military contracts. 
Development of niche products has been suggested as one way for Po-
land to compete in the European arms market."' Enterprise managers 
launched numerous projects at the beginning of the 1990s for the production 
of items thought to be in demand on the international market. Only very few 
were implemented. Generally speaking, failure was due to flaws in the plans 
or conflicting signals from the government concerning privatisation, but also 
the fact that the international armaments trade dwindled at the beginning of 
the 1990s struck Polish producers hard. Old customers in the Middle East 
were now on an embargo list drawn up by NATO and adhered to by War-
saw. No state aid to mitigate the drop in sales was forthcoming. No decision 
was taken before the question of state ownership was solved. Some antici-
pated that the sell-Qff was going to happen swiftly, others that the state would 
retain some degree of ownership. Enterprise plans differed accordingly with 
most presenting some plans hoping to gain some public financing, and with a 
few desperately scrambling for new partners mid new products.146 
Nevertheless, it was difficult to identify exactly which were the sectors 
where Poland had anything resembling a comparative advantage capable of 
being ~xploited. On this point the Czech Republic was perceived as being in 
a comparatively better position. It was expected that Czech armaments 
producers would concentrate on the production of optical instruments, a field 
where they were regarded as highly competitive. But like in Poland, stalled 
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privatisation and the lack of a consistent government policy on armaments 
production undermined whatever advantages Czech industry had at the time. 
InApril1999, the Polish government decided to launch an all-out privati-
sation and sell its controlling stakes in six industrial concerns producing ar-
maments. This involved aircraft factories in Warsaw and Rzeszow, two 
machine factories in Gliwice and Warsaw, a centre for industrial optics in 
Warsaw, and the personnel safety equipment called Maskpol. These consti-
tuted the concluding cluster slated for privatisation following 26 other com-
panies where the state was in the process of relinquishing its position as 
major shareholder.147 This move had been made possible through the rather 
surprising support of the local trade unions. Their hope was that new own-
ers would be able to secure punctual payment of wages. This had been im-
possible while the enterprises had remained in state ownership. The govern-
ment expected that new owners would be able to diversify production. In 
some cases this had already happened, a few enterprises had expanded their 
production for the civilian market after military contracts had diminished. These 
enterprises have been able to attract western attention and joint production 
offers. More are likely to come as a result of clearer Polish reform priorities. 
Likewise, the Polish government has formulated a clearer set of rules for 
international co-operation to guarantee that the mistakes of the early 1990s 
are avoided. Offers that open for Polish research and development input will 
be priorities. 
The Russian option 
The preceding section may have given the impression that Western produc-
ers were alone in offering their products. That was far from the case. Rus-
sian companies vied for contracts as well. They emphasised the fact that 
their products were already in use, but in need of upgrading. Furthermore, 
industrial co-operation would be far easier than in the case of the Western 
newcomers. Russian producers already had a network of contacts with 
Polish enterprises and industrial research institutes resulting from decades of 
close CO-Qperation. The armaments industries in the Warsaw Pact countries 
had been interconnected through a system of centrally, i.e. Moscow, given 
orders whereby production of an item was subdivided among several pro-
ducers. Although some, most notably Czechoslovakia and to a lesser degree 
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Poland, developed and produced some items independently, most countries 
relied on Russia for design of new products, as well as upgrading and spare 
parts.'" 
After 1989, Moscow tried to retain Russian dominance in the armaments 
market in various ways. Russian politicians and producers knew that the 
Central European countries would be compelled to upgrade their equipment, 
and concluded that the cheapest solution would be continued dependence on 
Russian products and upgrading of extant equipment instead of opting for 
Western-made goods. This sounded reasonable, but only if two aspects 
were overlooked. One concerned the fact that armaments like security poli-
tics were thoroughly politicised. Choosing Russian-made products would be 
regarded as a signal of political allegiance. Secondly, Russian materiel was 
not NATO compatible and would therefore contravene Polish membership 
aspirations. 
The Russian side was probably well aware of these problems, but tried 
to maintain their position in the region by linking armaments with Russian debt. 
All the former planned economies in the region had accumulated substantial 
sums outstanding in the course of the late 80s. Various arrangements were 
proposed to settle the issue. Due to the desperate lack of hard currency, Rus-
sia had to pay in kind. The Central and East governments agreed to this pro-
vided oil and natural gas made up a sizeable share of the settlement. Russia 
refused and required instead that armaments should play a dominant role. 
With the notable exception ofSiovak:ia, negotiations hardly progressed."' 
Poland avoided the entire issue by opting for a so-called zero option in 
1995 whereby mutual debts were annulled. This option benefited Russia 
economically. In Poland, many expressed astonishment on how a solution so 
obviously disadvantageous could have been signed. The Polish side could 
probably have extracted some sort of compensatory arrangement for arma-
ments e.g. spare parts deliveries, but chose to forfeit this possibility. Thus, 
Poland avoided being involved in lengthy negotiations with Moscow pressing 
for a settlement amounting to continued reliance on Russian deliveries. 
But this did not mean that Russian attempts to gain a foothold on the 
Polish market stopped. Parallel to the negotiations on Russian debt the 
Polish-Russian Commission for Trade and Economic Co-operation had in 
1994 signed a protocol with the clause 
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... there is a political will to conclude a framework agreement on 
armaments cooperation between Poland and Russia in line with inter-
national practice. Such dn agreement could become the basis for broad 
co-operation, including joint production and marketing of special 
products. 150 
The Russian side made the first move. Some months after the signing of 
the protocol, Moscow proposed that Polish aviation producers could be given 
a licence to manufacture MiG-29, in return Russian Baltic fleet vessels could 
be repaired in Polish naval yards. Although the pr~posal was la~~ched at a 
time when the renewal of the Polish air force was high on the pohl!cal agenda, 
Warsaw did not make any commitments on the issue. 
Two years later, in 1996, a more detailed Russian initiative aimed directly 
at a select group of small, and struggling Polish arms producers was launched. 
Virtually all of these had previously been involved injointproduction a~e­
ments with Russian enterprises. In a few cases, the RussJan proposal gamed 
a positive response. These mainly concerned the production of s~~ parts. 
In 1998 presidentKwasniewski went on what was labelled a pnvate 
visit'' to Moscow, ostensibly to attend the Tchaikovsky competition. During 
his stay, he met with Yeltsin and invited him to Poland. Yeltsin accepted and 
according to Polish sources indicated that it was nece~sary that ~ey pu_t the 
issue ofPolish NATO membership behind them and giVe the relatwnsh1p a 
fresh start.'" In the wake of the Tchaikovsky summit, as it was later known, 
the Polish defence minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz stated that the dialogue on 
military and security matters should be reopened as well. Some Po_lish arms 
manufacturers may have thought that this opened for the re-establishment 
of joint production and co-operation with Russian enterprises and_ex~ected 
the possibility to be seized upon by their Russian counterparts. Th1s d1d not 
happen. Joint development of new products has failed to materialise. 
But the issue ofRussian MiG planes remerged towards the end of the 
decade. Upgrading would be a cheaper solution than purchasing ~r le~ing 
new planes. But Poland was reluctant to enter into any co-operatiOn _w_l~. 
Russia alone. Thus, when the German government explored the possJbJ!JtJes 
for upgrading of its MiGs inherited from the former GDR air force, Poland 
watched closely to see whether there would be an opening for a third coun-
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try. With Germany involved, the possibilities ofRussian domination would 
have been less. 
The German plans envisaged that upgrading would be undertaken as a 
joint project with Russian producers. Why the German plans failed is not 
easily explainable. Strategic Survey 1999/2000 claims that it was due to 
official Russian opposition to participate in the upgrading of new NATO 
members."' Although this view may have played a role at the time, the 
Russian position soon changed completely. Far from discriminating against 
Poland or the other central European countries in recent years, Russian 
arms producers have long tried to attract Polish interest. Although the shelf 
price of Russian products is exceptionally low when compared to western 
products, running costs are high and the prospects ofbeing dependent on 1 
Russia for spare parts prohibitive. The problem of spare parts has been 
solved mainly through purchases from Ukraine. The Ukrainians were left 
with a significant part of the Soviet armaments production and have there-
fore been able to maintain the output of some items; in other cases the 
Ukrainians have simply dismantled some of their own equipment and sold 
off the parts. Similar practice is well known from Poland and the other 
countries in the region. When Poland decided to purchase 22 MiG-29s from 
Germany, upgrading was completed by Polish enterprises without Russian 
participation. 
illlultlnationality and lnteroperability 
One important mechanism for achieving interoperability has been participa-
tion in multinational units. Other motives should be included when accounting 
for why the Polish authorities have emphasised this option. From a NATO 
perspective, multinational units may be readily deployed on missions where 
the security interests of an individual member country are not directly threat-
ened. Polish participation thus increases Poland's credibility as an alliance 
member. This asset may then be translated into increased influence in NATO 
decision-making. Whereas other NATO members explore the possibility of 
cutting costs through participation in multinational units, to Poland the double 
benefits of increased competence and increased standing within NATO have 
been at the forefront. 
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As mentioned previously, the possibilities of joint units with the eastern 
neighbours Ukraine and Lithuania are being explored. Progress has been far 
swifter in the other direction. In March 1999, Poland together with Denmark 
and Germany established the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin. This 
was the first permanent multinational unit formed in Central Europe with 
participants from the West. The importance attributed to this Corps in Po-
land is considerable. Apart from the prestigious aspects connected with be-
ing the host nation to the Corps, it is widely praised for its diffusion ofWest-
ern skills and practices to a wide number of Polish officers.1" 
It should be added that Polish participation in the Corps, but in particular 
the ongoing efforts to establish multinational units with Lithuania and Ukraine 
have attracted criticism from Belarus and Russia. In the Russian Military 
Doctrine, bothPfP and bilateral Western engagement in countries neighbour-
ing Russia or its allies, were presented as security threats.1" In the case of 
Belarus, the possibility of a Polish attack and Western engagement in the 
Baltic has been a recurrent item in president Lukashenka's speeches over 
the past years. As far as can be ascertained, Polish politicians or security 
experts have never presented the reactions from Minsk or Moscow as ar-
guments in favour of disbanding multinational units with the eastern neigh-
bours. Instead, the prevailing attitude seems to be that the criticism is hardly 
unexpected and should rather be taken as an indication that the Polish ef-
forts serve their ultimate purpose, namely tying the eastern neighbours closer 
to the west and thereby limiting Russian influence. 
Army 2012: a grand approach? 
The political struggle surrounding civilian control over military and security 
matters that went on untill996, ruled out any radical reforms or major pro-
curement projects .I'' Only in 1998 did the government launch a large-scale 
reform plan called "Army 2012: The Foundation of the Modernization 
Programme of the Armed Forces 1998-2012".1'' 
Significantly, the reform document was merely approved by the govern-
ment, but not given the status of a decree. This meant that although it was 
formally binding on all government agencies, it could easily be modified 
without involving parliament. Officially, it was claimed that this approach 
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would provide the Ministry ofDefence with sufficient flexibility to adapt the 
plan to meet future NATO requirements.1" Yet, this seems implausible. The 
Ministry could most likely have counted on parliament's approval ifitwould 
become necessary to change the plan. It seems rather that the Ministry was 
aware that "Army 20 12" most likely would have to be modified in the fore-
seeable future and would therefore prefer to avoid making too specific com-
mitments that would later have to be broken. 
"Army 2012" also envisaged changes in defence industry. Yet, apart from 
the expected emphasis on the need to retain a national pool for future R&D, 
no specific measures were outlined. The unsolved questions of privatisation 
versus continued state ownership, and the extent of military procurement in 
the oncoming years were not specified, even though one might have ex-
pected the latter point to be discussed in some detail in the reform document. 
Yet, on one point the document heralded a major change: all previous plans 
and documents pertaining to the defense industry launched during the 1990s, 
had underlined the need to retain a large production capacity in case Poland 
was denied membership in the Alliance. This approach had now been over-
taken by the approaching memb.,rship. Polish armaments producers would 
have to attract international partners for new investments, state orders 
would no longer be sufficient to keep production running. 
"Army 2012" also emphasised the need for reducing bureaucracy. The 
military-administrative division inherited from the Warsaw Pact was changed. 
Instead of the four, the country was divided in two districts: the Pomeranian 
with Wroclaw as centre, and the Silesian with headquarters located in 
Sydgoszcz. The powers of these were limited to providing administrative 
and logistical support for the ariny. Command authority would rest with the 
planned Territorial Defense Forces. 
. . "Army 20 12" called for a reduction in the number of personnel serving 
m the armed forces to 180,000 by 2004. Although national conscription was 
to be retained, the reform document projected a rapid increase in profes-
sional personnel to two-thirds by the year 2012. Although much of this reform 
document has been modified or postponed, increasing the share of profes-
sionals has been retained in all later reform plans. 
Another difficult part concerns the need to reduce the number of senior 
officers. But the problem is not just one of numbers and salaries. The top 
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echelon constitutes a conservative element that has been able to block or 
dilute necessary changes. Secondly, unless vacancies are created, junior 
officers educated in the West will find their career ambitions thwarted and 
seek other sources of employment. Early in March 1999, the Ministry of 
Defence decided to reduce the number of senior officers sharply as part of 
the reforms.!'' 
Improving infrastructure 
Of all the priorities listed in "Army2012", modernisation of communication 
systems and the training of the required personnel to operate them were 
among the few that actually were implemented. In fact, if it had not been for 
American financing, it is dubious whether this project would have been com-
pleted. The U.S. approach was not a complete exchange of technology, but 
a careful selection of those units that would require the most up-to-date 
equipment urgently. The recipients were Polish forces singled out for inter-
national operations. For the remainder of the armed forces, efforts have 
been taken to link the extant analogue technology with NATO's digital. 
NATO has long provided funding for infrastructure projects, but the 
Polish side was expected to contribute as well. How much depended on the 
project in question. Usually, the Polish side covered labour costs. If con-
struction materials required were available on the Polish market, these 
would usually be included in the Polish contribution. But tasks regarded as 
urgent would usually be covered entirely by NATO. One example was the 
installation of a NATO compatible system for air traffic control.!'' 
In addition, military bases and training facilities were modernised. Naval 
installations and a few airfields have been improved to meet NATO stand-
ards, other airfields were to be selected later pending a final decision on 
which of the former 55 Warsaw Pact airfields would be closed. Likewise, 
storage and depot facilities have been singled out for upgrading in order to 
make them usable for NATO troops. NATO will continue to come forward 
with fmancial assistance for these purposes. Some sums had been allocated 
during the late 1990s to meet the most urgent demands only to grow in size 
after membership was a fact. In April200 I the Polish minister of defence 
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Bronislaw Komorowski announced that NATO had pledged to spend $650 
million on the upgrading of infrastructure."' 
The Polish armed forces had counted approx. 400,000 during the 1980s, 
the facilities and installations inherited were far in excess of what was 
needed. Political statements and earlier plans have thus all underlined that 
upgrading was to run parallel to closures of facilities no longer needed. As a 
rule, these were often outdated and located in the wrong place. A strict re-
structuring was needed. "Army 20 12" called for reductions in general infra-
structure spending and a concentration of resources to a few select areas. 
But exactly where these reductions were to be made was left unspecified. 
This was to be worked out by the MoD. In this, the ministry did not prove 
very successful, closures were fiercely resisted by the local population and 
politicians. 
Procurement and defence budgets 
During the 1990s, Western armaments producers focused closely on Poland. 
They were eager to gain a foothold on the Polish market once the MoD had 
decided on what to prioritise. But procurement of new equipment remained 
limited. One case which attracted considerable criticism abroad and taken 
as a proof that Poland was unreliable, concerned a contract signed with BAE 
Systems RO Defence, a British manufacturer of tank turrets. A contract was 
signed which opened up for joint production involving Polish armaments en-
terprises. But soon after, the order was sharply reduced due to unforeseen 
funding problems.161 
One reason why upgrading has been a protracted affair and suffered 
many setbacks is the lack ofbudgetary realism. Polish politicians will often 
point the finger at the military establishment and claim that their plans ex-
ceed the resources available. This is undoubtedly true, but they are not alone. 
During the debate on enlargement costs, Polish estimates took government 
pledges that the defence budget would hover between 2.05 and 2.32 per 
cent ofGDP between 1998-2012, as their point of departure.162 During this 
period, the economy was expected to grow at slightly more than four per 
cent.1" Neither has happened, the estimates for economic growth have not 
been met, and the pledges on the defence budget have not been fulfilled. 
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The share ofBNP allocated to defence reached 2.16 per cent in 1996. In 
the following years the share diminished to 1.95 per cent in 2001.164 This 
affected planning badly, and made it imperative to base all upgrading pro-
curement plans on greater realism. 
In the Defence Strategy Document passed by the Polish government in 
May 2000, two pages are devoted to "Defense Planning and Program-
ming'."' Despite the brevity, the pledges are explicit: 
. .. we will regularly develop 6 year long programs for defensive prepa-
rations laying down the key assignments in the field of facilities main-
tenance and technical and organizational development as well as 
proficiency improvement of the national defense system ... and estimation 
of the necessary financial resources. 166 
The reform package launched in 2001, nick-named the Komorowski plan 
after the then minister of defence, is an attempt to fulfil this pledge.167 
The Komorowskl Plan 
"Army 2012" was an attempt to divest the armed forces of the legacy of 
the Warsaw Pact. This legacy was not only a question of superfluous bases 
and outdated equipment, but also rules and procedures suited to an entirely 
different military structure and mentality from NATO. Closure of bases 
would have enabled a reallocation of funding. Institutional reform would 
have reduced bureaucratic red tape. Together, they might have made the 
modernisation targets listed in "Army2012" less unfeasible. 
It has been suggested that one of the reasons why "Army 2012" largely 
failed, was the lack of information concerning the extent of problems among 
the planners. One might add that the planners aggravated the problem by 
setting remarkably short deadlines. For instance, in mid-1998 the programme 
was further extended with a list of 65 itemized objectives that were to be 
implemented in preparation for NATO membership, i.e. in the course of half 
a year (sic). 
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A new approach based on greater realism was required. In January 2001 
the Polish government adopted a new comprehensive modernisation plan 
entitled "Programme for the Technical restructuring and Modernisation of 
the Polish Armed Forces 200 1-2006".'" The plan had been prepared by the 
General Staff working in close contact with the Ministry of Defence. This 
time, one of the major pitfalls of previous initiatives, the lack of co-ordination 
and failure to gain the prior approval in the ministry and in the General Staff 
needed to present a united position to Parliament was to be avoided. 
According to the plan, in the course of a six-year period, troop numbers 
will be reduced by one quarter from the present level of200,000 to approx. 
150,000. This is a continuation of the reductions envisaged in "Army 20 12" 
where a level of 180,000 was to be achieved by 2004, with further reduc-
tions being implemented ending with a level of around 150,000 soldiers were 
to be achieved by 2012. The 200 I plan furthermore envisions that half of the 
army, i.e. 75.000 men will be made up of professional soldiers. To achieve 
this, an increase in pay is required. Newspaper articles have pointed to the 
dismal pay levels for officers.'" The private sector can offer more and has 
been able to attract a large number ofthe qualified specialists the armed 
forces need to retain in order to be able to modernise. 
Much attention is devoted to equipment upgrading. Upon launching it, 
prime minister Jerzy Buzek declared that by 2006, one third of the army 
would be using modem equipment and thus be fully interoperable with other 
NA1Dunits.170 To achieve this, spending on new equipment is to be increased 
drastically. The increase is daunting, and impossible to fulfil unless the minis-
try and the armed forces succeed in the efforts of closing unnecessary bases 
and installations and selling off military real estate. This point was particularly 
emphasised in the Programme. 
Declaring this to be an urgent task is, as has been mentioned previously, 
nothing new. But the price of failure may this time be significantly higher 
than before. This is not only a question of misplaced investments and the 
galloping costs of maintaining useless equipment, but also one of psychology. 
Although important progress has been made in different areas, the endless 
stream of project plans and reforms documents have hardly had a positive 
effect on efficiency in the armed forces. Considerable time has been spent 
discussing proposals, assessing ramifications and suggesting modifications to 
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superior staff elements, only to experience that plans are scrapped or post-
poned awaiting new revisions. Po/ska Zbrojna, the leading Polishjoum~l.on 
military and security issues, has devoted endless pages to new plans, rev1s1on 
of old, and theirnot infrequent dismissal after a period of time. Thus, when the 
front page headline runs "Now, a six-year plan!", the irony is hardly coin-
cidental.'" 
The root of the problem may well be the mismatch between the aspira-
tions ofboth military leaders and politicians and the means available to im-
plement them. That problem is solvable provided that plans are better co-
ordinated and based on greater financial realism than in the past. If not, the 
armed forces will lose confidence in the politicians' will to allocate the means 
required and politicians will despair at the unexpected delays and rising costs 
experienced in the course of every reform and end up questioning the wisdom 
of military advice. 
Polish experts tend to pointto another explanation when questioned about 
the lack of reform progress. They claim that there is a lack of interlocutors 
able to bridge the civilian-military gap. Both sectors tend to draw up plans 
and scenarios with scant attention to each other. The lack of integration has 
a negative impact on Poland's position within NATO. The constant stream 
of information, queries and requests coming from NATO requires skills and 
experience to sort out the essential. Without interlocutors, this becomes diffi-
cult. The problem for NA1D is that requests will not be met with a swift 
reply, let alone necessary modifications of reforms or policies if that is called 
for. Subsequently, this becomes Poland's problem too. 
NATO has long been monitoring Polish budgetary developments closely. 
In their view, the Polish defence budget is insufficient to assure the neces-
sary level ofinteroperabilitywith NATO. NATO's Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe (SACEUR) General Joseph Ralston pointed this out during 
a visitto Warsaw in January 2001.172 The response from the minister of 
finance Jaroslaw Bauc was noncommittal, he did not promise any increase 
in the defence budget despite NA1D criticism.173 But it would be wrong to 
jump to conclusions based on previous failures. The current Programme 
differs radically from its predecessors on two accounts: 
First of all, budgetary expectations seem to have been set within realistic 
limits. For the period 2002-2006, the defence budget is expected to amount 
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to approx. 1.95 per cent of GNP annually. According to minister Komorowski, 
the reform plan has been based on the military receiving this share through-
out the reform period.'" This is slightly less than the 1999 level when the 
defence budget made up 2.05 per cent. 175 These sums are to be augmented 
by income generated from the sale of obsolete training grounds and build-
ings; according to the plan the sums will be between 200 and 250 million 
zloty ($50 to 60 million). Although the feasibility of these stipulations may be 
questioned, even if the final results tilt towards the lower end of the range, 
the impact on the reforms sbould not be too serious. In 1999, the defence 
budget ran to 12,599 million zlotys.'" 
Secondly, the General Staff has now been located within the Ministry's 
structures. This is a clear signal that the General Staff now has been made 
subordinate to the political leadership of the ministry. Double planning and 
the resulting bureaucratic infighting which has marred reforms so far, may 
thus have been eradicated. 
Army pre·eminence 
. Ever since Poland left the Warsaw Pact, all Chiefs of the General Staff 
have been army officers. The army is by far the largest branch of the 
armed forces. The almost 120,000 strong Land Forces comprise approx. 70 
per cent of all manpower. 
Consequently, all reform plans and initiatives focus on the needs, problems 
and potentials of the army. Although all parts of the army have been affected 
by the modernisation plans, units trained to be deployed in international op-
erations under NATO command have received preferential treatment. Ac-
cording to the reform progranune referred to above, by 2006 one third of the 
army will have reached a standard "comparable to that of European armies, 
especially in the spheres of reconnaissance, command, air defence, general 
armaments and material, and individual equipment for soldiers" .177 
Irrespective of whether the deadline will be met or not, the units intended 
for international operations receive resources far in excess of those allo-
cated to the rest of the army. According to the deputy chief of the General 
Staff, the division will unavoidably result in "well-trained selected units fur-
nished with relatively modem equipment, with the rest of the units being low 
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category. A considerable portion of the Army would turn i~to a ~ort of '?obi-
lisation centre. "17' Polish officers and politicians have ear her vmc~ the I~ 
objections to the division of the army into an A and B team. In an mterv1ew 
with the newspaper Wprost in late 1998, the then minister of defence, 
Janusz Onyszkewicz, argued that it was time to leave this discussion behind 
and move ahead with military reforms.'" He admitted the gap be~een 
those troops singled out for international service and the rest, but claimed that 
this was not a particularly Polish phenomenon. Other, richer countries in the 
West were also compelled to prioritise units that would participate in interna-
tional operations. Expecting that the entire Polish army would receive the 
same kind of modem equipment was unrealistic. 
Some officers and politicians have criticised the emphasis given to inter-
national operations at the expense of defence against an attac~ fro~ ~e 
east. Russian control over Belarus has taken the place of Russian m1htary 
build-up in Kaliningrad in their reasoning for why Poland must remain pre-
pared to counter any Russia_n-Ied ~ggression. It .s?ould be_ noted that those 
sharing this opinion, have faded to mfluence deciSIOn-makmg. 
Air force • a laggard? 
In 1989 Poland owned 565 attack airplanes.'" By the turn ofthe century, this 
numbe; had been more than halved declining to 267 .'"Only a very limited 
number have been upgraded to meet standards. These aircraft have been 
equipped with global positioning navi~tion s~stem and 'ide_nt~fication-friend­
foe' equipment manufactured under hcence m Poland. Th1s IS regarded as 
little more than an interim solution; how to renew the air force has been 
strenuously discussed since the mid-90s. 
In early November 2000, the Ministry of Defence signalled that it was 
interested in a US offer for the leasing of sixteen F-16 fighters.'" The U.S. 
offer is estimated to cost Poland approx. $200 million over a five-year pe-
riod. Although the deal might involve offset agreements for Polish industry. 
worth around $100 million, unless extra-budgetary resources are made avail-
able the price will be impossible to meet. . . . 
Developments took a new turn in April200 I when the Pohsh Mm1stry of 
Defence stated that the country would require 16 new fighter planes by 
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2003 and 60 by 2006.183 But again, financing was left out. Deputy defense 
minister Romuald Szeremietiew said that potential bidders had been con-
tacted and given "specific conditions through diplomatic channels." They 
had been asked to compile their offers by the end of May thus enabling the 
government to make its decision by the end of June. A remarkably short 
time limit, one might add. 
Not surprisingly, this caused considerable criticism in Parliament. The 
deputy chairman of the Sejm's Defense Committee, Jerzy Szmajdzinski of 
the opposition Democratic Left Alliance, claimed that the plans had been 
issued at a particularly awkward time. The government's term was moving 
towards its end with a renewed lease on power far from certain, he argued. 
Szmajdzinski feared that even if a decision were made before election time, 
the next government might overturn it and return the issue to a status quo 
ante. "What we don't need is for the next election winners to start their rule 
by verifying, vetting, and upsetting contracts which ... are worth close to $4 
billion," Szmajdzinski added. To avoid that, the tender proceedings should be 
fully transparent and as public as possible and supervised by the main politi-
cal forces. 1" In the end, the issue has been postponed till after the election. 
Quite another question, which Szmajdzinski left out, is whether the politi-
cians will be willing to allocate the means needed. After years of impressive 
growth rates in BNP, signs of recession could be detected at the beginning 
of200 I. Convincing Parliament that defence expenditure should be increased 
sufficiently to allow for an upgrading of the air force will be very difficult, if 
possible at all. 
The issue of new fighter planes is clearly the most pressing, and hotly 
disputed of all modernisation priorities. It has almost overshadowed the deci-
sion. made in late August 2001 to purchase eight transport planes from the 
Spanish CASA plane manufacturer. us The deal is worth $211 million, but 
according to the agreement CASA has agreed to purchase 51 per cent of 
the shares in the Polish PZL Okecie aerospace company. Until now, Okecie 
has been entirely state-owned. A foreign owner will, if the contractual inten-
tions are carried out, provide it not only with new managerial skills and pro-
duction modernisations, but also give it access to the Western market. 
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Plans for the navy 
The preferential treatment of army units singled out for international service 
and the difficulties connected with renewing the air force have at times put 
the plans and problems connected with naval upgrading in the shadow. The 
main exception has been the US donation of two Perry frigates. This was 
done on the condition that the Polish navy financed their upgrading. Upgrad-
ing involved fitting them helicopters. This seems to have been an unexpected 
cause of delay, negotiations on the acquisition of the helicopters have so far 
not been finalised. When that is done, the timeframe for the acquisition and 
upgrading ofthe second frigate will be completed. This timeframe will also 
include a financingplan. 1" 
Upgrading the frigates is costly. Suggestions have been made that work 
on the second should be postponed. One reason is that the operating costs 
of the one completed are said to be far higher than the original estimates 
indicated.187 Nevertheless, the navy has emphasised that operating costs are 
far below the sums required by comparable vessels already in the Polish 
navy. Whether this argument is sufficiently strong to secure the financing of 
the second Perry frigate remains to be seen. 
The frigates are the most recent acquisitions, but plans have been made 
for the construction of new corvettes and mine destroyers.1" Although still 
on the drawing board, a naval five-year-plan covering the years 2001-2006 
indicates that work on the first mine destroyer should start by 2003. 
An upgrading plan attributed with considerable importance bythe navy, 
concerns the three small fighting vessels of the Orkan class. The plan cov-
ers new missile systems, fitting of new radars, and installation of electronic 
warfare and decoy deployment systems. The Dutch THALES company 
will be responsible for the integration of all subsystems into one combat sys-
tem}" According to statements from admiral Ryszard Lukasik, Commander-
in-chief of the Polish navy, the contracts with the foreign suppliers are due 
to be signed before the end of2001.190 This will enable a complete upgrading 
of all three ships by 2003. Although the contractor is Polish, THALES will 
play a key role. If this turns out successful, i.e. completed within budgetary 
limits and according to agreed time schedules, it is expected that this approach 
will form a pattern for the upgrading of the four Tarantula-class corvettes. 
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Poland has three submarines in service. According to the navy 2001-2006 
plans, two of these will be decommissioned in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
Building new ones is regarded as too costly. A far cheaper solution is to pur-
chase decommissioned submarines from allied countries. In August 200 I, 
Poland expressed an interest in buying two, possibly five of the Norwegian 
Kobben-class submarines. 191 They all date from the mid-60s but have later 
been modernised before they were decommissioned in 200 I. 
Moreover, the navy plans to phase out its MiG fighters and supplant them 
with Polish-made patrol aircrafts and helicopters. Implementation will depend 
on the size of future defence budgets. Thus, one may assume that other needs 
have been given greater priority. 
But not all renewal is pending on future budgets. In autumn 200 I, the navy 
commissioned a new logistics vessel. Originally, the ship had been scheduled 
for delivery in Russia, but due to payment problems the agreement was 
cancelled.192 The vessel can be used for maintenance, as hospital, and for 
command and control of maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. It will 
be based in Swinoujscie. · 
Intelligence and secret services 
The gap between Polish and Western standards in intelligence gathering and 
handling constitutes an obstacle to co-operation with other NATO countries 
that should not be overlooked. Within NATO, this has remained a topic for 
criticism.1" Poland has been slow in changing both the legal basis for its in-
telligence services and the procedures for handling sensitive material issued 
by NATO. 
The first perceptible changes in Polish military intelligence started after 
the fall of the Communist regime, but not as the outcome ofWestern pres-
sure but as a response to domestic changes. The general conflict in Polish 
society between the old Communist elite and pro-Western forces unavoid-
ably affected the intelligence sector. Soon after signing the PfP-agreement, 
the question of continued employment of security officers recruited by the 
Communist regime was raised by NATO .I" The Alliance was worried that 
the Polish side would not be able to keep military technology and sensitive 
information secret. These problems only increased in the course of the 
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1990s. Closer relations between Poland and NATO meant that the amount 
of information transferred to Warsaw increased, at the same time the efforts 
made by the Polish authorities to streamline the country's secret services 
were judged insufficient. It should be added that many Polish security ex-
perts share this view.I" 
But Polish criticism against the country's intelligence organs has so far 
paid scant attention to the impact on Polish-NATO relations. Instead, focus 
has been given to the abuse of secret material for political purposes. Perhaps 
the most famous example occurred in 1996 when prime minister J6zef 
Oleksy was accused by the minister of internal affairs of being a Russian 
spy.196 The accusations were later rejected by the state prosecutor as 
groundless. The new prime minister transferred the State Security Organ, 
UOP, away from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and vested it with the 
Prime Minister's Office.1" The Military Intelligence Service, WSI, was not 
affected.1" 
This did not end the controversy surrounding the secret services. Espe-
cially the use and more often abuse of files dating from the Communist era 
have been surfaced in public debate at regular intervals. The need to put an 
end to this played an instrumental role in the most recent institutional innova-
tion. Early in 1999, it was decided to create a Special Services Committee 
consisting of the ministers for internal affairs, foreign affairs, defence, the 
heads of the UOP and the WSI and the leader of the National Security 
Council, an organ affiliated with the Presidential Chancery.199 The Commit-
tee was to be subordinate to the Prime Minister's office. 
As the brief survey above makes clear, the controversies have been con-
fined to domestic affairs. NATO has so far been left out. But the questions 
that have been raised concerning professionalism and imperviousness to ex-
ternal pressure are unlikely to have passed unnoticed in Brussels. The fact 
that the Polish Parliament passed the necessary legislation to streamline 
Polish laws with NATO regulations on military security late in 1998, is a step 
in the right direction but hardly sufficient. 
The lack of institutional "fire-walls" protecting the security services from 
political pressure might eventually undermine Poland's position within NATO. 
One ofPoland's obvious comparative advantages is the detailed knowledge 
of the neighbouring countries to the East. Combined with a wide network of 
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contacts, both political and economic, Polish analysts are able to follow de-
velopments closely. This is of value to other Alliance members, but in order 
to function as a reliable supplier, the integrity of the services amassing the 
information should be beyond reproach. 
After the elections in autumn 2001, the heads of the WSI and UOP re-
signed due to disagreements over the new government's reform plans. The 
contents of these plans are not known. 
Kosovo 
The war against Yugoslavia and subsequent peace keeping in Kosovo have 
served as test cases for Poland's ability to contribute to NATO. Polish politi-
cians quickly drew a parallel between the oppression of the Albanian popu-
lation in Kosovo and their own sufferings under German occupation. In retro-
spect, this may seem somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, public opinion and 
the political elite were far more unanimous on the need to act than for instance 
their Czech colleagues.''" 
NATO's war against Yugoslavia and the subsequent establishment of 
KFOR, turned out to be somewhat of a test case for the three new mem-
bers. Poland was a strong supporter of the operations. Like the two others, 
overflight and land transit rights were rapidly granted to NATO. In addition, 
the usage of Polish airbases was offered. But the Polish government was 
alone in making a public commitment ofPolish combat troops. There was 
no noticeable opposition to this in Parliament. Apparently, Polish units would 
have been used if the plans for operation BRAVO, i.e. a ground invasion of 
Yugoslavia, had been implemented in the event that the air strikes failed to 
have an impact. 
Polish commitments to KFOR were extensive. The original contribution 
included its 800-man elite 18th Air Assault Battalion. This was subsequently 
extended with a platoon ofLithuanian soldiers and additional troops from the 
I Oth Logistics Brigade. In July 1999, the Battalion was exchanged with sol-
diers from the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion. This was a small, but unnoticed 
diplomatic victory for Poland and NATO. The Ukrainian parliament had been 
critical ofNATO'sactions, but acquiesced to letting the joint Polish-Ukrainian 
force be deployed. 
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In March 2000, Poland was among the few NATO countries to reply 
affirmatively to NATO's request for additional troops. 600 men from the 
1 OthArmoured Cavalry Brigade were sent to Kosovo. The initial plan was 
to deploy them only for a two-month period, this time limit has been repeat-
edly extended. Poland was alone among the new entrants to increase its 
initial commitment. Hungary's contribution remained a military police unit of 
350 men, the Czech a !50-man strong reconnaissance company. . 
The overall strength of the Polish contribution places the country m the 
"middleweight class" of countries like Spain and the Netherlands sending 
1,200 and 2,050 soldiers respectively. These are the countries that Polish 
military representatives frequently quote as comparison. 
Failed attempts: headquarters and contingency plan 
Since becoming a member, Poland has invested considerable efforts in 
achieving two targets. One is the adoption of a contingency plan for Poland 
specifying allied assistance to Poland in case of attack. The second concerns 
the establishment of a sub-regional headquarters on Polish territory. Both 
attempts have failed for different reasons. But since the reasoning behind 
the efforts is rather similar, some words on why Poland tried to gain support 
for these issues in NATO are merited. 
During the Cold War, specific contingency plans enumerating potential 
threats, war theatre operations and detailed reinforcement scenarios covered 
most of Western Europe. At present, NATO operates with two contingency 
plans, one coveringtheNorthAtlantic area, the other Eastern Turkey. Although 
these plans are still retained, the entire planning process underwent a change 
from 1995 when emphasis was given to so-called generic plans. These lack 
the formers' detailed account of enemy intentions, interests and forces. In-
stead, emphasis is given to how potential conflicts may develop and how 
allied forces may be deployed to the area affected. 
The change in plan contents must be seen in connection with the empha-
sis in NATO's Strategic Doctrine given to small-scale conflicts and crisis 
management as well as the efforts to improve relations with Russia. Adopt-
ing a contingency plan for Poland would strongly contravene these efforts. 
Moreover, one might add that it would also undermine Poland's attempts to 
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convince Russia that Polish membership as well as further enlargement to 
the Baltic states is not directed against Russia. Leaving the possible diplo-
matic repercussions aside, why Poland has pursued the issue of a 'Polish' 
contingency plan is somewhat bewildering. It would be wrong to ascribe this 
to an inadequate understanding or acceptance ofNAID's changed role and 
retention of outdated perceptions on European security. Polish participation 
in international operations and the emphasis on mobility and flexibility in mili-
tary modernisation plans flouts such an interpretation. Rather, the issue 
seems to have to do with national prestige, a contingency plan would repre-
sent a tangible proof ofPoland's importance as an alliance member. 
The issue of national prestige has undoubtedly been at play concerning 
the question of a sub-regional headquarters in Poland. Poland has argued 
that due to size and geographic location, one of these or an additional should 
be located in Poland. Pushing this issue, very much like the desired contin-
gency plan, has been described as 'flogging a dead horse' by other NATO 
representatives. The question of sub-regional headquarters is up for revision. 
Although the fmal outcome of the process has not been settled yet, new 
headquarters will be dependent on the presence of a corps. The Poles have 
argued that the multinational Danish-German-Polish Corps in Szczecin quali-
fies. Yet, this seems unlikely, not least because oflack of German support 
for the Polish project. 
A more suitable strategy for Poland could be to make its own national 
headquarters NATO compatible specifYing how NATO could use it if an 
emergency should arise.Aithough this option will not provide the same kind 
of prestige ideal for internal political consumption, it provides the kind of or-
ganisational flexibility NATO desires. The Komorowski plan referred to 
previously is a step in the right direction.201 Six priorities are listed, greater 
capacity to function as host to NATO activities is listed as one of these. 202 
Burden sharing and comparative advantages: what role 
for Poland 
NATO concerns over Poland's upgrading record should not only be regarded 
narrowly as a question ofPolish military capabilities. Failure to implement a 
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realistic upgrading plan has wide repercussions on alliance burden sharing. 
Priority areas like communications, airspace surveillance and technical infra-
structure would not have been improved unless NATO footed the bill. Bilat-
eral donations from the US have also played a key role. But this was all 
regarded as interim solutions necessary because the Polish side quite clearly 
lacked funds. Not all allies were equally happy with this situation. The quar-
rels at the Madrid Summit in 1997 over enlargement financing illustrate the 
divisive potency of these issues. With the next enlargement round approach-
ing, burden sharing will re-emerge on the agenda. This is why the Komo-
rowski plan is so important, and why failure this time will be infinitely more 
costly politically. But it would be wrong to painttoo bleak a picture. The 
planners have learnt from previous mistakes, having now gained a far better 
idea of the problems and NATO's requirements. The plans are based on 
greater realism. 
On the side ofNATO, no grand plan for how enlargement costs should 
be financed has been drawn up. It proved politically too difficult. So far, up-
grading has been fmanced from common NATO funding. This has been 
increased through slightly higher membership fees. What still remains un-
clear is bilateral aid. This is not only a question of the actual sums involved, 
but also donors' conditions. A question that is difficult to answer, but should 
be posed nonetheless, is to what extent the dividing line between assistance 
and sales ventures is being blurred. The most important outside donors ever 
since the first PiP projects were launched, have been the US followed at 
some distance by Britain and Germany. These countries are also the most 
important exporters of armaments to Poland. But here it is possible to detect 
an improvement. Industrial co-operation with the West, although still limited, 
is no longer entered into just to maintain production. Polish participation in 
innovation and development of new products will be given weight when 
Western offers are considered. Polish authorities are now in a position to 
negotiate and press for improved terms of co-operation, a decade ago this 
was hardly the case. 
As indicated above, upgrading now seems to stand a better chance of 
success. If so, Poland will be less of a burden. The question then arises 
what Poland's contribution to the Alliance will be in addition to military ca-
pacities interoperable with other NATO countries. 
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Poland has a comparative advantage compared to the other NATO 
countries. The co-operative relationships with Ukraine and Lithuania provide 
Poland with an insight into regional developments surpassing other NATO 
countries. Co-operation is proceeding at different paces, with noticeably 
more progress in the case of Lithuania. In the case of Ukraine, results have 
failed to meet expectations. But it should be added that Poland based on its 
own transition from communist planning to market democracy, has a suffi-
ciently realistic perception of the problems to avoid being disappointed and 
withdraw. The relationship with Ukraine is an asset. Developments in 
Ukraine have strong repercussions on the surrounding countries. Thanks to 
the detailed knowledge ofUkrainian affairs, Poland should be in a prime 
position to influence NATO policies. 
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Polish membership and alliance cohesion 
Enlargement would have an impact on alliance cohesion. The question was 
how? The fact that the new members were all Central European countries 
tied to Germany with economic and political links, made some conclude that 
NATO would now see the emergence of a cluster of countries dominated by 
Germany.'03 Central Europe would be Mittel-Europa with Berlin as the pivot. 
Such a development would affect cohesion badly, first of all by weakening ties 
between France and Germany, but possibly also by undermining the German-
American relationship that had grown so close during German unification. 
Some believed that enlargement to Central Europe was a mistake insofar 
as the greatest security challenges to Europe were found ·on the southern 
shores of the Mediterranean. Expanding eastwards meant that attention 
would be drawn away from these problems and commit scarce Alliance 
resources that could better be used elsewhere. As previously mentioned, the 
French president expressed these views in no uncertain terms at the 1997 
Madrid Summit. 
In Poland, questions of Alliance cohesion rarely figured on the agenda in 
the years preceding enlargement. Western musings over what would happen 
to the Alliance now that the "common glue", i.e. fear of the Soviet Union 
was gone, never made an impact on the Polish debate. Seen from Poland, 
enlargement would be the next task that should unite the Alliance once 
more."' Misgivings over enlargement were often reduced to French stubborn-
ness and anti-Americanism. It was an easy task to find French statements 
supporting such a view. 
But this was simplifying an important issue. Poland's choice of Alliance 
partners would have an impact on the Alliance. Reciprocally, the extent to 
which Poland managed to gain other members' support would define 
whether Poland would be able to influence alliance policies. Recapping part 
of the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters, Poland will depend on 
sizeable financial transfers from NATO and on bilateral assistance in the 
near future. Close co-operation with other members will reduce possible 
opposition to this. Moreover, attempts to extract a stronger western engage-
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ment in Ukraine and assurances that the next round of enlargement will 
include at least Lithuania of the three Baltic republics, will remain futile un-
less other members support Poland's position. These questions will be dis-
cussed here. 
However, the first part of the chapter will be devoted to the bilateral rela-
tionship with Germany. During chancellor Kohl's years, it grew very close. 
The question is to what extent this rapprochement has been continued under 
the current German leadership. Especially the French political leadership 
feared a Central European block led by Germany. 
Finally, the Polish view on the EU's commitment to create a military pillar, 
the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) will be discussed. Polish 
politicians and security experts fearthatthis will weaken the US engagement 
in Europe. At the same time, a clearer delineation ofEU's security role has 
strong repercussions on Poland. 
The Polish position relative to this development has, as will be shown 
here, been rather ambiguous. This is a position that Poland shares with some 
of the other European NATO members. This chapter will therefore end 
with a discussion of whether this opens up for a new, Atlanticist block with 
Poland as member. 
Germany 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Polish politicians regarded the close relationship 
between Moscow and Bonn with apprehension. Chancellor Kohl became 
aware of this and initiated a pattern of co-operation between Germany and 
Poland to reduce the reasons for concern. Eventually the German govern-
ment played a very active role advocating Polish membership in NAID."" 
Kohl also became an advocate of Polish EU membership. During a short 
span, political contacts deepened and relations improved considerably."' 
This rapprochement did not outlast the change of governments in Ger-
many in 1998. Among Polish politicians and security experts the prevailing 
perception is that Schrtider's government is far more preoccupied with EU 
reforms and the relationship with France, than with Central and Eastern 
Europe. In the months leading up to his election in September 1998, Schriider 
travelled to Poland and reassured that the foreign policy conducted under 
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Helmuth Kohl would not be altered.'"The Polish side assumed that this 
would amount to active German support for Poland's EU application. Never-
theless, in his first speech to the Bundestag as chancellor, enlargement of 
the EU was referred to very briefly and then only as a part of his so-called 
double strategy consisting ofboth "Vertiefung und Erweiterung"- integration 
and enlargement. Although most Polish observers may regret the ending of 
Kohl's diplomacy, others regarded Schriider's plans for the EU as more 
realistic arguing that only by reforming the EU internally would the Union be 
prepared to accept new members."'Nevertheless, this amounted to a strong 
change from Kohl's policy of active engagement. This was well phrased in 
a headline from a Warsaw newspaper running "Germany is turning away 
from Poland".'" 
Germany's disinterest was a serious problem because it meant in practical 
terms that Poland and the other applicants in the region were deprived of 
their most efficient source for information about inside processes in the EU. 
Polish politicians could use their contacts with German politicians and bureau-
crats both in Berlin and Brussels to gain support for their position. The Nor-
dic members Denmark, Sweden and Finland could have been a potential al-
ternative source of information and contacts provided they had co-ordinated 
their policies on enlargement. 
Compared to his predecessors Genscher and Kinkel, the current German 
foreign minister Joschka Fischer has been distinctly less supportive ofEU 
enlargement. His foreign policy has retained the traditional emphasis on 
good relations with France but without attempting to continue the policy of 
close contacts with Poland. 
· In a widely debated speech given in 2000, Fischer emphasised that the 
future ofEU co-operation will entail a transfer of national sovereignty to 
Brussels.21 ' Polish reactions were predictably negative. Fischer's visions 
were assessed in the light ofU.S.-European relations. In an article in the 
magazine Polityka, the commentator Adam Szostkiewicz summed up pre-
vailing views by pointing out that the EU's idea ofEurope often boils down 
to the relationship between EU and Russia.211 The lands-in-between are 
overlooked. Referring to a joint press conference with president Clinton and 
chancellor SchrOder in Portugal in June 2000, Szostkiewicznoted that 
whereas SchrOder talked about European independence, Clinton had been 
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concerned about democracy and human rights. 212 This meant, according to 
Clinton, that all countries sharing these values should be given a chance of 
participating in the European integration process. This was interpreted as 
continued U.S. support for Poland's position, as well as the other Central-
and East European applicants. 
Another issue where the two countries disagree concerns future NATO 
enlargement. Poland is, as mentioned previously, a strong advocate for the 
next round to include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The German line has 
been positive, though never as supportive as when Poland applied. Polish 
politicians have tried to elicit a stronger commitment from Germany without 
success. 
An exception to the lukewarm German support occurred in Late June 
2000. During a visit to Estonia, Waiter Kolbow, a senior German defence 
official, stated that Russian opposition t~ NATO membership for any of the 
Baltic countries must be overcome before any decision could be taken.213 
This seemed to confirm what Polish politicians and their Baltic colleagues 
had long claimed, that Russia enjoyed a de facto veto over further enlarge-
ment. The German MoD rapidly censured Kolbow, but this did little to 
dampen Baltic and Polish apprehensions over what they interpreted as lack 
of German support. 
A Central European Block? 
French fears over German pre-eminence after enlargement did not only 
focus on the bilateral relationship between Berlin and Warsaw but also on 
the possibility of a German-dominated Central-European block. But forGer-
many to assume a leadership role, two factors would have to be fulfilled. 
One was German ambitions tO play this role, such ambitions were difficultto 
detect especially when security issues were discussed. The other was the 
existence of a common perception of regional security problems that in turn 
would make joint efforts with Germany natural. During the first years of the 
1990s, some co-operation attempts between the new entrants seemed to 
indicate that a Central European block was emerging. 
One of these attempts was the efforts made by Czech government 
members and MoD officials to co-operate closely with their Warsaw col-
leagues. The motives had less to do with interests in any regional unity than 
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with Czech fears that the close relationship between Poland and Germany 
would limit enlargementto Poland alone.'" After enlargement, co-operation 
rapidly dwindled. Upon signing the NATO accession documents, the Czech 
Ambassador to NATO Karel Kovanda underlined that to the Czech, Hun-
gary and Poland were only two allies among 18, and that joint admission did 
not mean joint positions.'" 
This turned out to be true. Since joining in 1999, the three countries have 
not attempted to voice their interests of views en bloc. The lack of cooperation 
may represent lost opportunities. Poland and the Czech Republic face largely 
similar problems in their efforts to meet NATO's requirements, both have 
large armaments industries producing relatively similar equipment. Instead of 
competition, a pooling of resources could have led to cost-effective solutions. 
Some initiatives opening up for industrial co-operation were la)Jnched, but led 
nowhere. 
This pattern may now have been broken. In May 2001, a declaration of 
intent aiming at the establishment of a multinational battalion was signed 
between Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.216 The main intention is 
to diffuse Western practice to Slovakia as part of the Slovak leadership's 
strategy to adapt to NATO requiremepts. Like in the case of Lithuania and 
Ukraine, Poland will function as the intermediary. 
The practice of adding smaller groupings from the Central European 
countries to larger Western units has been an important learning experience 
for all parties, but has hardly provided the Central Europeans with any politi-
cal clout APolish-Czech-Slovak battalion will stand a better chance. 
The demise of the Weimar Triangle 
The lack of German engagement has meant that one of the pillars of Polish 
foreign policy has been weakened. Poland's problem is that compensating 
this through close co-operation with other NATO countries will hardly yield 
the same benefits. Relations with Denmark are good, but that country is 
hardly a motor in European integration. Co-operation with Britain is making 
progress in the military area, but the British government has a fur too am-
bivalent attitude towards European integration to be able to play the role as 
Poland's advocate. 
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One country that could have done that was France. Traditionally, relations 
between the two countries were close. Paris was the base of many Polish 
antkommunist exiles. After the collapse of the communist regime, it seemed 
as if contacts would be resumed and grow close. Common ground had been 
found in both governments' apprehensions over German unification. 
Kohl's successful policy of rapprochement with Poland eased Warsaw's 
fears, but actually only enhanced French concerns. The French government 
feared that German contacts with Poland would increase Berlin's political 
weight at the expense ofFrlinco-German co-operation."' France could not 
match Germany's importance as trading partner or political focal point. But 
if working in tandem, France might be less likely to interpret Germany's 
position as a threat to the close relationship between Paris and Bonn. In 
fact, both Germany and Poland welcomed a French contribution and pres-
ence in the region. Neither wanted to reduce Poland's integration with the 
West to a bilateral German-Polish venture. 
As a result, the so-called Weimar Triangle was established in 1991. Ex-
pectations were high at the time of launching. But little has been done to 
translate them into deeds. Co-operation involvingjoint military exercises, 
language training, exchange of officers and security experts, have developed 
rapidly between Germany and Poland. France has been involved only to a 
limited degree, and then at best on an ad hoc basis. The reason seems to be 
that France has objected to being drawn into a bilateral relationship that at 
·the time was progressing well. French insistence on the usage of French on 
an equ~l footing with German has not been conducive to co-operation either. 
But these factors dwindle in comparison to the French positions on EU en-
largement and a continued US engagement in European security, both per-
ceived as negative by Warsaw and contrary to Polish interests. 
The Weimar Triangle has thus not developed beyond the level of a dis-
cussion club. This was clearly reflected in a joint article written by a Polish, 
a French and a German researcher on the future of the Triangle published in 
August2000.'" The article was remarkable in that it was the first time in 
many years that anybody attempted to treat the Triangle seriously by sketch-
ing up possible future tasks such as the exchange of specialists, reinvigorating 
dormant co-operation projects, small seminars etc. None of this is very origi-
nal, and it should be added that all and more are regularly undertaken by 
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German institutes and research foundations. Thus, a renewed Weimar Tri-
angle, if that came to pass, would mean including France in the ongoing 
range of activities. 
Klaus Bachmann, one of the authors behind the article, concluded that 
the WeimarTriangle now has only one function: calming down the fears of 
the participants.'19 A necessary task perhaps, but hardly one likely to yield 
political dividends. 
Poland and Baltic enlargement 
PoiiJh politicians have used every occasion to support continued NATO 
enlargement. The prime objective is to get Lithuania accepted into the Alli-
ance. Although most other NATO countries have emphasised that NAID 
will remain open, only Denmark has been an active supporter of the Polish 
position. To Poland, the main problem is that Germany so far has avoided 
making any strong commitment to Baltic membership. 
Germany is not alone. Opinions differ between the other countries bor-
dering the Baltic Sea. Denmark and Poland have been the most vociferous 
advocates ofNATO expansion. In Sweden and Finland, the political leader-
ship seems to be at odds with security experts and the military establishment 
on the pros and cons ofNAID expansion. The Finnish chief of defence, 
Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has been a far stronger supporter of Baltic NAID 
membership than presidentHalonen.'20 In Sweden, the situation is the oppo-
site, with prime minister Goran Persson regarding enlargement as·a positive 
contribution to regional stability whereas the senior officers have professed 
the exact opposite position.221 Russia has remained opposed to NATO en-
largement."' But even this position seems to have been moderated recently. 
During a state visitto Finland in autumn 200 I, president Putin stated that it 
was every sovereign country's right to apply for NAID membership, an 
eerie echo of his predecessor's statement in Warsaw in 1997. But Putin 
refrained from adding that enlargement would have a negative impact on 
regional stability.223 
Russian politics towards the Baltic countries have rarely gone beyond 
that posture. No efforts have been made to start political talks on mutual 
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problems. Signs have emerged that this is changing somewhat with Russia 
being interested in closer contacts with the Baltic countries. To Russia, the 
prospect of Baltic EU membership raises a host of problems that can best 
be solved if Russia and the Baltic countries join forces. 
For most of the 1990s, the USA played a reticent role. The Clinton ad-
ministration preferred other Western countries to assume the lead. This 
strategy largely failed. The perceptions of Germany and Denmark have little 
in common with those of Sweden. Finland has been more concerned about 
creating close relations with Estonia, and has so far attempted to get the EU 
more closely involved in the Baltic area through the so-called Northern Di-
mension of the EU launched in 1997.224 Germany has been particularly re-
luctanttowards American participation in the Baltic Sea Council. In 1998, 
the U.S. representative at the Baltic Sea Council meeting was barred from 
participating during one of the sessions at Germany's request.'" 
The Clinton administration's policy on NATO expansion including any of 
the three Baltic countries was if not negative, then lacking in enthusiasm. 
Like in the case of Central Europe, the US preferred th~ EU to expand first. 
But the EU remained a slow mover with no explicit policy formulated for the 
region until the so-called Northern Dimension was launched in 1997. But what 
this Finnish idea meant for the Baltic region remained unclear, and at least 
according to one Polish foreign policy expert still remains so."' From a 
Lithuanian point of view, the Northern Dimension was regarded from the 
very beginning as concealment for Helsinki's ambitions to attract EU fund-
ing to projects tying bordering Karelia and Estonia to Finland. 227 TheN orth-
ern Dimension carefully omitted any reference to the region's security prob-
lems, i.e. the Baltic republics' sense of insecurity. Their response was to 
lobby the West, especially the USA for a clearer commitment in the region. 
This was achieved with the U.S.-Baltic Charter ofPartnership signed 
between the U.S. and the three Baltic States in January 1998. It provided 
the countries with a formal pledge that the U.S. was concerned about their 
security: "America's security is tied to Europe, and Europe will never be 
secure ifBaltic security is in doubt". 
TheCharterrepresentedacarefulbalancingactonbehalfoftheClintonAd-
ministration. US.Assistanceto the Baltic oountries in their transition towards 
democracy and market economy was promised, but NATO membership 
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was not included as part of this process. This meant that Russia would find 
little reason to object to the Charter. Activities that Russia disapproves of, e.g. 
military assistance asjointtraining and exercises, donation of military equip-
ment etc. are conducted either bilaterally or under the auspices ofPfP."' 
Compared to the ClintonAdministration's cautious policy on Baltic enlarge-
ment, president Bush has been far more assertive, a fact that has been wel-
comed by the Polish government and security experts."' In a speech made at 
Warsaw University in June 200 I, he stated that the Alliance remained open 
"without red lines or outside vetoes".'" Bush refrained from naming the 
countries heading the queue. Secretary of State Col in Powell was more out-
spoken during a congressional hearing held a week after Bush's speech. Powell 
stated that Washington would not accept a zero option, i.e. no enlargement, at 
the NATO summit in Prague in 2002. When urged by Senator J essie Helms 
on the possibilities of the Baltic membership, Powell answered that Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania had "a pretty good chance" provided they continued 
their efforts to meet the Alliance's military and political requirements.231 
Poland's role in the region has been limited to rhetoric~! support for NATO 
enlargement. Lithuania is the main exception. As discussed earlier, institu-
tional relations are remarkably close, this is less the case with the two other 
Baltic republics. 
But Poland can do little more than offer advice and share information 
with other countries that are interested in NATO. The fact that Poland is still 
dependent on large foreign investments to modernise the economy, means 
that Poland is unlikely to be able to offer anything in the form of material 
support. This kind of assistance has been forthcoming from other countries, 
notably the USA but also other NATO members have donated equipment. 
But Polish experiences in negotiating with NATO and the efforts undertaken 
to adapt to NATO's requirements are by no means inferior assets and will 
ensure that Poland may play a key role. 
Poland and the ESDI 
Poland's desire to join the EU is primarily motivated by improved market 
access. But like in the case ofNATO, full participation in an important deci-
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sion-makingforum was a prime objective. EU's economic and political sig-
nificance for non-members has been obvious since the begiiining of the 
1990s when the first aid and assistance agreements between Warsaw and 
Brussels were signed. 
Polish perceptions of the EU have mainly focused on its functions as an 
economic club, a trading block with an increasingly dominant position. Secu-
rity issues and military C(}()peration have hardly been offered any attention."' 
This is not so much the result of wilful neglect, as a reflection ofEU's lack 
of a clear profile on this issue for much of the 1990s. Only with the St. Malo 
meeting in December 1998 where the French and the British foreign minis-
ters agreed to intensity efforts to develop a European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI), did the EU seem to transgress the level of formal pledges. 
Pledges towards developing a European force were repeated at the EU 
summit in Cologne in June 1999. The Polish position was cautious. At a 
meeting in WEU, where Poland had the status of associate partner, the Polish 
representative Przemyslaw Grudzinski professed that Poland supported a 
stronger security and defence identity for the EU. 233 But when plans and 
suggestions for an autonomous military force, i.e. independent ofNATO were 
made known in the course of2000, caution changed to apprehension in Po-
land.'" In October, the Polish NATO Ambassador Andrzej Towpik argued 
that there was no cause for worry since the planned European military ca-
pacity would only undertake peace missions, humanitarian relief, and rescue 
operations."' 
Not until the Helsinki summit in December 2000 were any detailed, con-
crete statements made. At Helsinki, a "headline goal" of an independent 
reaction force consisting of50,000 to 60,000 troops by 2003 was declared. 
The force should be deployable within 60 days and have the necessary re-
sources to be sustained for a year. In the following, year, an embryonic mili-
tary staff, a political and security committee and, a military committee started 
operating. Four areas where the EU should attempt to C(}()perate with NATO 
had been identified: security issues, capability goals, EU access to NATO 
· resources, and the creation of consultation mechanisms between NATO and 
EU."' , 
This made it clear that EU's plans went far beyond the limited tasks 
mentioned by Towpik. Polish concerns did not abate. If the EU were to 
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become a strong autonomous security actor on the European continent, NATO 
could be undermined. This could eventually result in American disinterest and 
withdrawal from the continent, a Polish nightmare scenario. 237 Madeleine Al-
bright had warned in late 1998 against the EU initiating measures that would 
result in duplication ofNATO resources and tasks and the discrimination of 
non-Union members!'' These could eventually result in a "decouplini( of the 
U.S. and Europe. Poland adhered to this perception, and hoped that it would 
start a process within the EU that would be inclusive for non-members as 
well!'' In this connection, a sobering comment by minister of defence Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz should be recalled. Shortly before a NATO defence ministers' 
meeting in December 1999, he expressed dismay at the lacking precision in 
the EU's plans for crisis management forces. 240 But he added that he was too 
much of a realist to believe that the EU countries would come up with the 
necessary financial means to create a force that would be totally independent 
of NATO. 
The key to Polish attitudes to ESDI is not merely reducible to pro-
American sentiments in the population and among the decision-makers alike. 
Much should be attributed to Poland's experiences from the past decade of 
negotiations with the Union. To Western observers, and perhaps especially 
so for politicians and decision-makers inside the EU system, an enhanced 
security role including military means is the logical outcome of integration in 
other areas. This viewpoint is not necessarily the case for Polish observers. 
Not only have they so far been excluded from the economic integration 
process, but negotiations have been markedly lopsided. They have been 
characterised by EU demanding that the rules and regulations valid in the 
EU are to be transferred to Poland unabridged and with minimal if any tran-
sitional exemptions for Poland. Economic grants are withheld if adaptation is 
deemed insufficient. Membership negotiations have been in a deadlock with 
Polish failures to comply with several EU requirements, agricultural reforms 
often cited as the prime example. But the lack of progress on the EU side, 
especially the failure to agree on necessary internal reforms before enlarge-
ment can be completed, should not be overlooked either. The negotiation 
climate has therefore not been without effects on the Polish attitude towards 
ESDI. 
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Polish participation 
The Polish position is that ESDI should be complementary to NATO and not 
independent of it. The problem for the EU is a lack of equipment necessary 
to undertake operations. !fEU is to use NATO facilities, the Alliance members 
will have to grant their approval. Poland and Turkey long refused to enter 
into any agreement with the EU that would lead to a division of resources. 
Both were dissatisfied with EU's inability to suggest any framework for co-
operation with non-EU members on security issues. 
The Polish and Turkish attitude has vexed France in particular. At an 
informal NATO meeting in Birmingham in October 2000, the French minis-
ter of defence Alain Richard attempted to cahnapprehensions by confirming 
" ... for our non-EU allies our readiness to discuss any subject, without a 
priori, situated in the framework of the principles and decisions of the 
European Council."'"11 Yet, this assertion was rendered meaningless by two 
facts, one the lack of any willingness to discuss the aspects in the bilateral 
negotiations with Poland so far, and by Mr. Richard emphasising that: 
" ... the development of consultation and cooperation between the EU and 
NATO must take place while respecting the EU's total autonomy (and, of 
course, that of the Alliance) in decision-taking".'" This amounted to little 
more than a reiteration ofthe traditional French viewpoint. Other EU coun-
tries do not have the same reservations as France in engaging in close co-
operation with the Alliance and will therefore be closer to Poland's views. 
Poland wants to participate in ESDI on an equal footing with the most 
prominent EU members. Poland applied for NATO membership in order to 
gain influence over the deveiopment of European security. Hence, staying 
outside what might become an important securitypolicyforum does not 
make sense. Thus, when the European countries both inside and outside the 
EU nominated units for the future Euroarmy, Poland offered units constitut-
ing one brigade.'" But a basic condition for Poland was that the country 
should be given real influence in preparation and execution of 
operations.244 This position was shared by other countries, most notably Nor-
way and Turkey. 
What has proved particularly aggravating for Poland is the EU's unwill-
ingness to develop consultative mechanisms where non-members could be 
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included. Polish politicians had hoped that the EU would perpetuate the ar-
rangements developed by the WEU where Poland had enjoyed rights only 
formally inferior to those of full members. In an interview with a Polish 
newspaper, foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek underlined that the same 
rights Poland had enjoyed in the WEU, should be continued in ESDI.'" 
When Norwegian politicians raised the issue prior to the Helsinki summit, 
it was made clear that the separation between those inside the EU and the 
rest would be far stricter than had been the case with the WEU. This means 
that Poland will be deprived of the institutionalised contacts provided previ-
ously, and thus be excluded from the EU's deliberations over ESDI at the 
formative stage. But Polish concerns also focus on the consequences ofESDI 
for the Baltic republics. They had status as associated partners with the WEU 
and thus access to information and a forum dominated by West European 
countries where they could present their views. EU's failure to agree on con-
sultative mechanisms means that they will be deprived of this possibility.'" 
The EU prefers to avoid the different affiliation categories that charac-
terised the WEU opting for a clearer distinction between those on the inside 
and outside. But the differing perceptions of security, setting Poland apart 
from countries like France and Germany apparently has played a role as 
well. The French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine repeatedly stressed the 
need for what he called "euro-centric" countries to join ranks and counter 
US proposals aiming at the subjugation ofESDI to NAT0.247 In Poland, this 
was interpreted as a deliberate move to keep countries with a strong 
Atlanticist orientation, like Poland, outside the ESDI until the EU could 
present anybody interested in participation with a fait accompli.'" 
Official statements indicate that Polish interest in the ESDI partly de-
pends on the EU's eastern policy, not so much towards Poland and the other 
membership candidates, as Ukraine"'. Henryk Szlajfer, head of strategic 
planning in the Ministry ofForeignAffairs, bluntly stated that unless the EU 
managed to create a closer relationship with Ukraine, then ESDI remains 
little more than idle talk.'" 
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An atlanticist block? 
Based on the discussion so far in this chapter, one might easily get the im-
pression that Poland's impact on NATO cohesion is difficult to detect. At-
tempts aimed at creating a close co-operation with other European alliance 
members have failed. The efforts to create a troika with France and Ger-
many led nowhere. Expectations that Poland and the two other new en-
trants would form a bloc headed by Germany had no basis in reality. If the 
planned establishment of a Polish-Czech-Slovak battalion is successfully 
implemented, the three countries may choose to co-ordinate their positions 
on some points. But it should be noted, that Poland was the only one of~e 
three to criticise the Helsinki Summit's failure to create consultation meclia-
nisms with non-EU members. 
Polish efforts to continue the close relationship created during Kohl's 
chancellorship, have not been reciprocated. Chancellor Schriider's lacking 
commitment is most certainly the failure that has been most disappointing. 
But a rapport with Berlin would have kept Poland abreast with developments 
in the EU, especially how the ESDI is evolving. Likewise, Poland could have 
offered Germany ideas and insight into regional developments. What the Pol-
ish side perceives as a lack of commitment from the German government 
has precluded this kind of close political dialogue. 
The question then remains which countries Poland is likely to co-operate 
closely with in the future. The key to that answer is the USA. Polish politi-
cians have remained distinctly pro-Arnerican in their views on European 
security. A continued US presence in Europe is regarded as indispensable. 
American politicians have tried to come forward with solutions to security 
problems that Poland regards as being of prime importance. The U.S.-Baltic 
Charter of Partnership counts among these, as does the US pledge to keep 
NATO open to future Baltic membership. Moreover, the US commitment to 
Ukrainian independence corresponds with Polish objectives. 
But the emphasis on a continued US presence in Europe cannot be un-
derstood unless Polish perceptions of Russia are included. It was stated 
introductorily, that Polish observers always regarded the possibility of an 
authoritarian backlash in Russia as more feasible than did many of their 
Western colleagues. In recent years, developments in Belarus have been 
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taken as proof ofRussian hegemonic ambitions in the region. Likewise, 
Russian animosity towards PiP and NATO enlargement has underlined the 
gap separating Russian and Polish perceptions of regional security. Thus, 
from a Polish perspective, proximity to Russia can only be balanced by a 
strong US presence and a vital trans-Atlantic relationship in NATO. Other 
countries share this perception. Norway, Turkey and Iceland shared Poland's 
apprehensions over the impact of ESDI on NATO's role. They fear that 
NATO will be weakened, and that paragraph 5 will be reduced to little more 
than a declaration of intent. 
These countries have consulted informally with each other when NATO 
has debated ESDI.'" Since this is an issue that will certainly feature on the 
agenda for the foreseeable future, co-operation between them is likely to 
continue. It should be added that ifPoland is included in the next EU en-
largement round, Warsaw will be able to function as an intermediary for the 
countries on the outside of the Union. Poland will have amassed consider-
able experience in how that role should be played to maximum advantage by 
then. 
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Concluding remarks: 
Poland in NATO - asset or burden? 
The question in the title cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Poland's 
impact on NATO is a complex issue. Based on the three aspects of Polish 
membership discussed in the preceding chapters: Polish eastern policy, up-
grading of military equipment and human resources, and the impact ofPolish 
membership on alliance cohesion, a few remarks will be presented here. 
Doing that, it is necessary to underline that it is still early days. General 
Wesley Clark may unwittingly have offered consolation to the Poles when 
during a visit to Warsaw in 2000 he claimed that reaching NATO levels 
would at least require a decade, a remark that gave him the front page."' 
This should not be taken as more than a deterrent against inflated expecta-
tions of how rapidly changes can be implemented and the benefits reaped. 
When attempting to balance benefits and costs ofPolish membership, a 
word of caution is necessary. Not all of these can be quantified and meas-
ured against each other. Some costs lend themselves easily to calculations, 
e.g. the readjustment of Polish fuel depots to meet NATO requirements; 
whereas the potential costs resulting from a more aggressive Russia do not. 
As will be recalled, much ofWestern enlargement debate focused on this 
aspect. Furthermore, whereas benefits will often be identifiable only after 
sonie time, calculable costs are, often more immediate. One of the benefits 
ofPolish membership to NATO rests in Poland's policy of actively engaging 
its eastern neighbours in co-operation. As will be argued here, this repre-
sents an untapped, i.e. future potential for the Alliance. 
Some comments are merited on whether the problems observed are 
transitional phenomena that will disappear as a result of closer co-operation be-
tween Poland and NATO, or whether they constitute more deeply entrenched, 
institutional obstacles requiring explicit political commitments to be effaced. 
Planning procedures are among the problems of a transitional nature that 
will diminish gradually as adaptation to Western practice gains ground. One 
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reason is NATO's criticism which will persist until practice improves. But 
NATO is not alone in this. Polish media have repeatedly and often gleefully 
pointed to the squandering of public money resulting from poor military plan-
ning and investment decisions. This has political consequences. The hard-
fought parliamentary control over the armed forces has resulted in transpar-
ency in the sense that planning and decision-making is subjected to political 
scrutiny. This has imbued the military leadership as well as the senior ech-
elons in the MoD with a greater sense of realism. This becomes clear when 
comparing the Komorowski plan to its predecessors. When interviewed 
about new projects, military leaders now often add "pending on the budget" 
when future procurements have been outlined."' Until the late I 990s, such 
trivial constraints were rarely mentioned when new strategies were pre-
sented by senior officers. 
A more difficult obstacle concerns the lack of rapport between the mili-
tary and politicians when reforms are being planned and implemented. This 
is a legacy from the past when military experts were usually conservative 
and used to having the final word. But even today, officers advocating re-
forms will find that their ideas and plans are easily discarded.'" Officially, 
the communications problems are admitted, but often discarded as past 
problems solved after the infamous Drawsko dinner in 1994."' Such an 
event is unlikely to be repeated, but the efficiency of parliamentary control 
may still be doubted. Andrzej Karkoszka, eo-chair of the Polish NATO ne-
gotiation team from 1995 to 1997 has recently remarked that "[t]here is still 
much to be done in this field."'" Parliamentary control may be expected to 
increase in the near future. Economic growth is not progressing as fast as 
expected, reforms have been postponed and state expenses are to be re-
duced by 6.5 per cent for 200 I .257 Cuts in the defence budget seem una-
voidable. But increased parliamentary watchfulness is not necessarily con-
ducive to greater efficiency. With unemployment looming, MPs may con-
tinue their fight against closure of military facilities, a fight that has been 
remarkably successful so far. 
But there is another gap, perhaps not as easily identifiable as the one 
above, this concerns the relationship between the military and civilian ex-
perts. Most Western readers are likely to feel that this is well-known terri-
tory, indeed similar conflict can be found in all bodies where these two are 
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present. But in Poland, this is not only a question of differing perceptions 
within the MoD or between the General Staff and other state bodies."' The 
gap also affects communication between the Polish NATO delegation and 
the decision-makers back home. When plans and ideas are launched in NA1D 
for discussion in the member countries, a response from Warsaw is at times 
issued too late, or in too general terms preventing the Polish delegation from 
participating effectively in deliberations. Hungary and the Czech Republic are 
referred to as examples of how important swift responses and efficient 
decision-making is for a country's standing.'" To mitigate this problem, a 
political initiative from the goverrnnent must be forthcoming. The coalition 
government that lost parliamentary elections in autumn 200 I was unable to 
muster the necessary strength to implement necessary reforms. Whether 
the new government will change this record, remains to be seen. 
The armaments industry is another area where gradual change is evident. 
Direct state involvement is diminishing and more responsibility is being allo-
cated to the enterprise level. The need to gain prior approval and backing 
from government offices in Warsaw in every instance will be lessened and 
decision-making speeded up. Entering into co-operation with Western com-
panies will be greatly facilitated. The original intentions, that Polish enter-
prises should be major contributors in the upgrading process, will be more 
feasible. 
Polish eastern policy: buffer or intermediary? 
Polish eastern relations have increased in scope and depth during the 1990s. 
The initial problems have largely been overcome. Co-operation in political, 
military and economic areas are expanding. When compared with the obsta-
cles posed by national stereotypes and unsolved historical disputes at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the improvements are remarkable. 
The main and worrisome exception is Belarus. In this case, Poland is 
impotent. Alone, little can be achieved. Trade and political contacts are too 
feeble to be used to lobby the regime in Minsk. Poland has to rely on OSCE 
to exert pressure. But the OSCE has so far achieved little more than cos-
metic legal changes. Furthermore, the OSCE is alone. Belarus has lost its 
guest member status in the Council of Europe. The EU has no office in that 
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I country and NAlD has frozen its relations with Belarus. Trying to exert 
influence via Moscow, i.e. to make Russia support anti-Lukashenka political 
forces in Belarus seems hypothetical. Moscow's response to the openly 
rigged parliamentary elections in Belarus in October 2000 was congratula-
tory. Polish perceptions ofRussia will be strongly influenced by Russian 
regional policies in Central- and Eastern Europe. And since this is an aspect 
of Russian foreign policy that so far has been offered scant attention in the 
West, Polish perceptions may easily be at odds with those of its Western 
allies. 
Russia is not perceived as representing a direct military threat to Poland. 
But the possibility that Russia may resort to military means to exert favours 
and concessions from some of the countries in-between, e.g. Latvia and 
Ukraine, is occasionally mentioned as a possibility should Russia resume a 
more aggressive foreign policy. If that were to happen, Poland's security 
would be impaired. 
Whereas Belarus is a constant source of instability because of its current 
political leadership and Russia's support for the incumbent regime, the threats 
to Polish security emanating from the other neighbouring countries are based 
primarily on reform failures. This does not apply to all the countries in equal 
strength, but above all to Ukraine and the Kaliningrad enclave. In both cases, 
Polish resources are far too limited to mount any rescue operation that could 
secure economic growth and political stability. 
The relationship with Ukraine plays a pivotal role. It has developed posi-
tive!}\ but is not an unequivocal success. Political relations have not been com-
.plemented with strong economic links. Polish contacts have for long been 
mainly focused on the Ukrainian president and goverrnnent, only recently 
has attention been widened to include the opposition. Polish politicians have 
sought to attract Western interest and engagement in Ukraine well aware 
that an economically weak and politically fragmented Ukraine would hardly 
be the desired buffer between Russia and Central Europe. Although the full 
scope and political implications of the rapprochement between Moscow and 
Kyiv observed during the first half of200 1 cannot yet be discerned, Polish 
reactions have been apprehensive. A stronger Russian presence, not to 
mention influence, over key sectors in the Ukrainian economy is equated 
with increased vulnerability for Poland. 
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From a Polish perspective, membership in NATO provides the country 
with guaranteed military assistance in case of attack. But NATO also con-
stitutes a forum for the discussion of regional security problems and a plat-
form fornegotiations with Russia. These possibilities were aptly illustrated 
when Poland eo-chaired the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council from 
March to June 2000. Due to Russia's opposition to NATO's war against 
Yugoslavia, no substantial discussions took place under the auspices of the 
Council. Recent Russian initiatives concerning the Kaliningrad region and 
statements from the Kremlin may indicate that relations with Moscow and 
Warsaw are improving. Nevertheless, perceptions of how regional security 
issues should be solved are unlikely to change. Polish advocacy ofNATO 
enlargement to the three Baltic republics will not be met with greater under-
standing in the Kremlin. But president Putin's statement in Helsinki and later 
in Brussels in autumn 200 I indicates that Russia is unlikely to make Baltic 
membership into an obstacle hindering co-operation with the West."' 
Poland managed to launch and consolidate an Eastern policy at a time 
when NATO distinctly lacked one. NATO's attention was overwhelmingly 
focused on Russia. Some efforts have been undertaken to recti:(y this state 
of affairs and include the countries in between in a more direct relationship 
with Brussels. The signing of a charter with Ukraine was an important step, 
but few concrete measures have followed. Poland and the USA are practi-
cally the only NATO countries that have exerted sufficient potency and re-
sourcesto engage in long-term co-operation with Ukraine. 
Polish eastern policy has had a positive impact on NATO in that it has 
contributed to regional stability. Polish relations with Lithuania have given 
that country a close link with NATO, and the policy towards Ukraine offers 
the leadership in Kyiv the possibility of counterbalancing Russian influence. 
But much ofPoland's future ability to remain an active player depends on 
how NATO's policy towards the region develops. 
NATO's policy may assume two different directions: one is enlargement 
to include one or all of the three Baltic applicants, the other option is post-
ponement with a continued emphasis on PfP as an interim solution. But even 
ifNATO decides in favour of enlargement, PfP will continue to be a major 
tool not only for drawing the prospective members closer to the Alliance, but 
also as the institutional tool for developing closer links with Ukraine as well 
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as Russia. Exactly how this will develop is of relevance to Poland. The re-
sources available for co-operation with the eastern neighbours are limited. 
But if conducted under the auspices of the PfP, other countries will share 
the expense either directly or through NATO funding. Poland is a prime 
example of how PfP was used as a preparatory programme leading to full 
membership. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would like to copy that passage. 
In the wake of the last enlargement round, the future of PiP was doubted. 
Fears were expressed that interest in PiP would wane among those European 
countries that had applied for membership without being included in the 1999 
enlargement round. A relapse into old nationalist patterns was thought possi-
ble since the only political parties that would profit from NATO's no would be 
the extreme right and left having opposed membership from the beginning. 
That did not happen. One reason may have been the stage of reforms the 
applicant countries had reached by 1999. Democracy and market economic 
conditions have become sufficiently entrenched to weaken the support for 
extremist parties. But a strong factor has been NATO's pledge that the Alli-
ance will not be closed to new members in the future and a strong commit-
ment to continued PfP activities.261 
At the Washington Summit in 1999, two new initiatives were launched to 
retain the relevance of the PfP. One was the so-called Enhanced and More 
Operational Partnership, the other the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for 
those countries aspiring to join the alliance."' EMOP consists of four elements. 
The frrst concerns the development of a Political-Military Framework for 
NATO-led PfP operations. The intention is to give the partner countries a 
greater say in NATO-led crisis management operations in the future. 
Secondly, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) by which projects 
initiated by partnership countries are evaluated, is to be continued with in-
creased emphasis on interoperability between NATO and those partner 
forces earmarked for NATO-led operations. To achieve this, a PARP Min-
isterial Guidance was adopted at the Summit to increase co-ordination in the 
development of the partners' crisis-management forces. 
Improved military co-operation is also the target of the third initiative, the 
so~alled Operational Capabilities Concept. The chief aim is to increase joint 
operational capabilities enabling the Alliance to assemble ptp forces with the 
skills required to handle crisis-management operations similar to those un-
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dertaken in Bosnia and Kosovo. To achieve this, a pool of multinational for-
mations trained in peacetime ready to be deployed at short notice will be 
developed. In order to upgrade the human resources involved in partnership 
activities, EMOP includes an educational and training element consisting of a 
PIP Consortium of defence academies and security studies institutes, a PIP 
Exercise Simulation Network, and PIP Training Centres. 
At a meeting with representatives from the PIP countries in October 2000, 
NATO presented a new plan for how the process is to proceed.'" NATO 
will identify areas where co-operation stands the greatest chance of success. 
Not only will this allow NATO to concentrate resources, but the PIP coun-
tries will be forced to defme their priorities among the different fields of ac-
tivities where NATO perceives PIP contributions as possible and ultimately 
force enhancing. This may provide Poland with a window of opportunity. As 
mentioned previously, co-operation with Lithuania and Ukraine has endowed 
Polish military advisers with considerable expertise, a resource that may be 
exploited more easily if institutionalised in the new PIP. 
Upgrading: too little, too late? 
Upgrading of the armed forces to make them more interoperable with NATO 
has so far been a dismal affair. Plans have been economically unfeasible, bud-
getary constraints have rarely been taken into account when procurement 
plans have been launched. The consequences are serious in that Poland's 
dependence on financial transfers from NATO for infrastructure purposes 
will remain high. But the other NATO countries will be increasingly unwilling 
to foot the bill unless planning realism and implementation rates improve. 
Thus, the outcome of the Komorowski plan will be watched carefully by 
Poland's allies. The political consequences of failure here should not be un-
derestimated: laggards lose influence. Poland will find it difficult to gain sup-
port for new ideas and initiatives requiring assistance or participation from 
other members, if Poland is perceived as not having undertaken the neces-
sary upgrading measures on its part. Minister of defence Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski's claim from 1996 that "Poland's entry would have a tremen-
dous impact on NATO" may then be taken as little more than typical wishful 
thinking.'" 
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An aspect of upgrading that has been successful concerns Polish par-
ticipation in the establishment of multinational units. These include Polis_h 
participation in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, as well as the umts_ 
established jointly with Lithuania and Ukraine, and the planned Czech-Pohsh-
Siovak battalion. A special role has been played by the Multinational Corps 
Northeast in Szczecin which is widely regarded as an important source of 
western ideas and skills for Polish officers. 
Poland has invested considerable resources into these units and has con-
sistently emphasised willingness to participate in international missions. But it 
is an emphasis that has entailed political costs. The units singled out for inter-
national missions and multinational force formations represent only a smaller 
segment of the Polish armed forces. The resulting split into an A team re-
ceiving modem NATO equipment, and a B team having to make do with far 
less has been criticised. The government has admitted this policy of prefer-
ential treatment, but has pointed to the fact that other western countries 
have chosen a similar approach. Poland's adherence to this pattern should 
be taken as a proof that they are willing to participate fully in allied interna-
tional operations. Participation in distant areas is regarded as a safeguard; 
other countries will be more willing to assist Poland in the event of an emer-
gency. When dispatching ofPolish contingent to participate in the GulfWar, 
a Polish diplomat stated: 
As a nation that has been subject to invasion and annexation more than 
once in our history. we feel it important to have some of our soldiers in 
the Gulf as a way of underscoring our commitment to the inviolability 
of our own borders.'" 
Cohesion: odd man out? 
The quotation above reveals an understanding of the linkage between alliance 
membership and membership obligations as something far more exacting than 
preparing for allied assistance in case of an attack from the east. As .s~ch, it 
would make for an optimistic conclusion to this study. Nevertheless, It IS 
necessary to question an argument implicit in much of the discussion on the 
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preceding pages, namely that Poland's regional policies represent an asset to 
the Alliance and that this value will be increased even more once upgrading 
has progressed even further. That assumption may not be shared by all NATO 
members. The Mediterranean countries, especially France will perceive the 
impact differently, and negatively because Polish views usually follow US 
policies closely. This has been most strongly felt in the case of ESDI where 
Poland has expressed its reservations in unusually strong terms. On this 
issue, Poland has aligned itself with the other NATO flank states Norway, 
Turkey and Iceland, all outside the European Union and all strongly support-
ive of retaining a good trans-Atlantic relationship. 
But in comparison to the three other states, Poland seems the most likely 
candidate to join the EU in the foreseeable future. Nothing indicates that 
Polish views on the ESDI are likely to change. Poland will most likely con-
tinue to pursue a political line which puts NATO at the forefront, preferring 
to see ESDI relegated to functions that will not conflict with NATO 's agenda. 
This position will provide Poland with much political cl!Jut both in NATO and 
EU, and it will also have a considerable impact on future European security 
and defence politics. As discussed above, Polish interests and concerns of-
ten differ from those of the larger EU countries. So far the Union's eastern 
policy has above all been focused on Russia. Once inside, the EU will have 
to accommodate Polish concerns over developments in countries in-between: 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
Poland's historical predicament has been the role of a buffer state. The 
quest for membership was based on a strong sense of insecurity. President 
Lech Walesa expressed it thus in 1992: "There is Russia, which threatens, 
the West, which is frightened, and us in the middle.'~" 
Based on the discussion presented here, it is possible to conclude that this 
role has now been confined to the past. Poland has created a network of re-
lations with countries not only in the east, but also with other western coun-
tries sharing Poland's perceptions. CCHlperation has reduced the deep-rooted 
sense of vulnerability. "The notion that security is invariably and for all time 
predetermined by geography has been one of the more durable fallacies pro-
moted by theories of international relations.'~" What is different for Poland 
now is not so much that it is the border country ofNATO, but that NATO 
membership makes it possible to use this very location as a valuable asset. 
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